Plimpton v. Gerrard
1995 Me. LEXIS 286, 668 A.2d 882 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff has standing to bring a claim for tortious interference with an expected inheritance even if they are not a beneficiary in the decedent's final will. The Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Probate Court over such tort claims seeking damages, while the Probate Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over actions to formally invalidate a will.
Facts:
- Bernard Plimpton was the only child of Flossie and Axel Plimpton.
- When his parents were elderly and in poor health, Martin Gerrard established a relationship with them.
- On June 26, 1989, Flossie and Axel Plimpton conveyed their homestead real estate to Gerrard, retaining only a life estate for themselves.
- On the same day, the Plimptons revised their wills to make Gerrard a substantial beneficiary.
- Axel Plimpton's revised will devised to his son Bernard only a grandfather clock, a coffee table, and candelabras, while devising the entire remainder of his estate to Gerrard.
- Flossie Plimpton died in 1991, and Axel Plimpton died in 1992.
Procedural Posture:
- Bernard Plimpton filed a three-count complaint against Martin Gerrard in the Superior Court of Kennebec County, a state trial court.
- Plimpton's complaint alleged tortious interference with an expected inheritance (Counts I & II) and sought to have his father's will set aside (Count III).
- The Superior Court granted Gerrard's motion to dismiss Counts I and II, ruling that Plimpton lacked standing because he was not a beneficiary of the real estate under the operative will.
- The Superior Court also dismissed Count III, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because will contests are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
- Bernard Plimpton, as appellant, appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who is not a beneficiary under a decedent's will have standing to sue for tortious interference with an expected inheritance in Superior Court, and does the Superior Court have concurrent jurisdiction with the Probate Court to hear such a claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Lipez, Justice.
Yes. A plaintiff has standing to sue for tortious interference with an expected inheritance even if not named as a beneficiary in the final will, and the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction over such a claim. The tort is based on the expectancy of an inheritance, and requiring the plaintiff to be a named beneficiary in the final, allegedly fraudulent, will would defeat the purpose of the cause of action. The claim arises from the interference with what the plaintiff would have received 'but for' the defendant's tortious conduct, which must be proven to a reasonable degree of certainty. Citing prior precedent in Cyr v. Cote and Harmon v. Harmon, the court affirmed that the claim protects the expectancy itself, which can exist even before the testator's death. Regarding jurisdiction, while the Probate Court offers a potential remedy, it is not exclusive. The Superior Court and Probate Court have concurrent jurisdiction over claims involving inter vivos transfers allegedly procured by undue influence. Because the plaintiff seeks damages, he is entitled to a jury trial, which is available in Superior Court but not in Probate Court. However, the court affirmed that any action seeking to formally set aside or invalidate the will itself falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the procedural options available to individuals who believe they were wrongfully disinherited. It establishes that a tort claim for interference with an expectancy is a cause of action distinct from a will contest, providing an alternative path to recovery. The ruling's affirmation of concurrent jurisdiction is significant because it allows plaintiffs to seek money damages before a jury in Superior Court, a strategically advantageous forum compared to the non-jury Probate Court. This precedent strengthens the position of disinherited potential beneficiaries by allowing them to directly sue the alleged wrongdoer in tort without being limited to the narrower, and sometimes more difficult, remedy of invalidating the will in probate.
