Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect
22 Ill. 2d 375, 1961 Ill. LEXIS 404, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality may not require a subdivider to dedicate land for public use as a condition for plat approval unless the need for the public facilities is specifically and uniquely attributable to the new subdivision. Requiring a developer to solve a pre-existing, community-wide problem constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.
Facts:
- Salvatore Dimucci, a real estate subdivider, planned to develop a subdivision with approximately 250 residential units in the Village of Mount Prospect.
- The Village of Mount Prospect had an ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate one acre of land for public use for every 60 residential building sites.
- Under this ordinance, the village required Dimucci to dedicate 6.7 acres of his land for a new elementary school and playground.
- Dimucci's subdivision plat complied with all village ordinances except for the land dedication requirement.
- Dimucci refused to dedicate the 6.7 acres of land to the village.
- As a result of his refusal, the Village of Mount Prospect refused to approve his subdivision plat.
- The school facilities in Mount Prospect were already near capacity due to the total development of the community, not just the proposed new subdivision.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs initiated a mandamus proceeding in the circuit court of Cook County against the corporate authorities of the village of Mount Prospect.
- The action sought to compel the village to approve a plat of subdivision.
- The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts.
- The circuit court found the land dedication requirement of the village's ordinance invalid and entered an order directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the plaintiffs.
- The trial court then certified that the case involved the validity of a municipal ordinance and that the public interest required a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does a village ordinance that requires a real estate subdivider to dedicate a portion of their land for public use, such as for schools and parks, as a condition for plat approval, constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation when the need for such facilities is not specifically and uniquely attributable to the new subdivision?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Hershey
Yes. A village ordinance requiring a subdivider to dedicate land for public use is an unconstitutional taking if the burden cast upon the subdivider is not specifically and uniquely attributable to their activity. The court reasoned that while municipalities have the power under state statutes to impose reasonable requirements on subdivisions, this power is not unlimited. Citing its prior decision in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, the court reiterated that a developer may be required to assume costs that are 'specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity.' Here, the need for additional school and recreational facilities was a result of the 'total development of the community,' as evidenced by the fact that existing schools were already near capacity. Forcing the subdivider to dedicate land to solve this pre-existing, community-wide problem is not a reasonable regulation under the police power, but rather a veiled exercise of eminent domain without providing just compensation, which is unconstitutional.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the influential 'specifically and uniquely attributable' test for evaluating the constitutionality of subdivision exactions (required dedications of land or fees) in Illinois. It significantly limits the power of municipalities to shift the costs of general community infrastructure, like schools and parks, onto new developers. The ruling forces municipalities to demonstrate a direct causal link between a proposed subdivision and the specific need it creates, preventing them from using developers to remedy pre-existing public service deficits. This case creates a crucial balance between a municipality's police power to regulate orderly development and a private property owner's constitutional protection against uncompensated takings.
