Pinter v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.
613 N.W.2d 110, 2000 WI 75, 236 Wis. 2d 137 (2000)
Rule of Law:
The firefighter's rule, interpreted as a public policy limitation on liability, bars professional rescuers like emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from recovering damages for injuries sustained while performing their duties when the injury arises solely from the negligent act that necessitated their rescue services.
Facts:
- On February 27, 1997, Stephen Jesmok and Herbert Otto negligently caused an automobile collision in Brookfield, Waukesha County.
- A woman who was a passenger in Jesmok's vehicle sustained injuries in the collision.
- Thomas Pinter, a firefighter and EMT for the city of Brookfield, was called to the scene to provide emergency medical assistance to the injured passenger.
- Pinter, in his capacity as an EMT, was required to maintain traction on the passenger's head, neck, and back to assist in safely extricating her due to a suspected spinal cord injury.
- To maintain the necessary traction, Pinter had to assume an awkward position for a period of time.
- As a result of maintaining this awkward position, Pinter sustained an inguinal hernia, a serious and permanent injury requiring surgical repair.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 29, 1998, Thomas Pinter filed a complaint against Stephen Jesmok, Herbert Otto, and their insurers in the Circuit Court for Waukesha County (the trial court), claiming his injuries were a direct result of their negligence.
- The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing Pinter's action was barred by the 'firefighter's rule' and public policy considerations.
- The Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Judge Patrick L. Snyder, granted the defendants' summary judgment motions, concluding that the firefighter's rule barred Pinter's action because his claims were based solely on the negligent driving that caused the collision.
- Pinter appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.
- The court of appeals certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a decision.
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Issue:
Does the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass v. Chicago & North Western Railway, bar an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident?
Opinions:
Majority - Jon P. Wilcox
Yes, the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass v. Chicago & North Western Railway, bars an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident. The court reaffirmed that Wisconsin's firefighter's rule is a public policy limitation on liability, not based on premises liability or assumption of risk, that bars recovery when an injury is too remote, disproportionate to culpability, highly extraordinary, or would place an unreasonable burden on society or lack a sensible stopping point. The court extended the principle from Hass, which barred recovery for firefighters injured by the negligence that caused a fire, to EMTs injured by the negligent driving that caused a collision. It reasoned that both firefighters and EMTs are professional rescuers specially trained and employed to confront dangers, and like fires, most automobile accidents are caused by negligence. Allowing recovery in such cases would place an unreasonable burden on drivers and contravene public policy by permitting rescuers to complain about the negligence that created the need for their employment, especially when the public already provides for their compensation through taxes. The court emphasized that the rule is narrow, applying only when the sole negligent act complained of is the same act that necessitated the rescue, and does not bar claims based on independent or aggravating acts of negligence.
Dissenting - Shirley S. Abrahamson
No, the firefighter's rule should not bar an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident. Chief Justice Abrahamson argued that the majority's conclusions regarding unreasonable burden, remoteness of injury, and lack of a sensible stopping point were made without sufficient explanation or justification. She contended that general negligence law is capable of addressing these concerns and often imposes liability for more significant burdens and remote injuries than those in this case. The dissent expressed concern that the majority's reasoning, based on professional training to confront danger, could be broadly applied to many other paid employees and volunteers (e.g., emergency room doctors, teachers), creating an overly expansive immunity for tortfeasors based solely on the plaintiff's occupation. It stressed that public policy should only preclude liability in infrequent and extreme cases, and that granting complete immunity from liability based on the plaintiff's occupation is not favored by negligence law or sound public policy.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and broadens the application of Wisconsin's 'firefighter's rule,' establishing it as a fundamental public policy limitation on negligence liability for professional rescuers, including EMTs, across various emergency contexts. The decision reinforces that such professionals generally cannot recover for injuries directly arising from the initial negligence that created the emergency they were called to mitigate. Future cases will likely focus on defining what constitutes a 'secondary or aggravating' act of negligence that falls outside this bar, distinguishing it from the 'initial negligence' that necessitates rescue. This ruling underscores a judicial preference for balancing societal burdens against individual recovery in the unique context of public service professions, potentially impacting worker's compensation and personal injury litigation for emergency personnel.
