Pinter v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.
2000 WI 75, 236 Wis. 2d 137, 613 N.W.2d 110 (2000)
Rule of Law:
The public policy rationale underlying the “firefighter’s rule” bars a professional rescuer, such as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), from recovering damages for injuries sustained while performing duties at an emergency scene, when those injuries are solely the result of the initial negligent act that necessitated the rescue.
Facts:
- On February 27, 1997, Stephen Jesmok and Herbert Otto negligently caused an automobile collision in Brookfield, Waukesha County.
- A woman who was a passenger in Jesmok's vehicle was injured in the collision.
- Thomas Pinter, a firefighter and EMT for the city of Brookfield, was called to the scene to provide emergency medical assistance to the injured passenger.
- To safely extricate the passenger, who appeared to be suffering from a spinal cord injury, Pinter was required to maintain traction on the passenger's head, neck, and back.
- Pinter had to assume an awkward position for a period of time during the extrication.
- As a result of maintaining this awkward position, Pinter sustained an inguinal hernia, a serious and permanent injury that required surgical repair.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas Pinter filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Waukesha County against Stephen Jesmok, Herbert Otto, and their insurers, alleging that his injuries were a direct and proximate result of Jesmok and Otto's negligence.
- The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that Pinter's action was barred by Hass (the firefighter's rule) and public policy considerations.
- The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that the reasoning of Hass applied to Pinter's case, as his claims were based solely on the negligent driving that caused the collision, and dismissed Pinter's claims with prejudice.
- Pinter appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
- The court of appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to decide the question of law regarding the firefighter's rule.
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Issue:
Does the firefighter's rule, as adopted in Hass v. Chicago & North Western Railway, bar an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident?
Opinions:
Majority - Jon P. Wilcox, J.
Yes, the firefighter's rule, based on public policy, bars an emergency medical technician (EMT) from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident when the injuries are a direct result of the initial negligence that created the emergency. The court reaffirmed the public policy reasoning established in Hass v. Chicago & North Western Railway, which holds that imposing liability for the initial negligence that creates the need for a professional rescuer's services would place an unreasonable burden on tortfeasors and enter a field with no sensible stopping point. The court explicitly rejected the historical bases of the firefighter's rule in other jurisdictions (licensee/invitee distinctions or assumption of risk), emphasizing that Wisconsin's rule is rooted solely in public policy. The court extended the application of this rule from firefighters to EMTs, reasoning that both are professional rescuers who are specially employed, trained, and compensated to confront dangers inherent in emergency situations. Similarly, it extended the rule from negligent fire-starting to negligent automobile collisions, finding them equivalent under the public policy analysis since both are commonly caused by negligence. The court clarified that Wisconsin's firefighter's rule is a narrow limitation on liability, only barring recovery when the sole negligent act complained of is the one that necessitated the rescue. It does not preclude claims based on independent or aggravating acts of negligence, such as negligent failure to warn of hidden hazards or negligent manufacture of a dangerous product.
Dissenting - Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice
No, the firefighter's rule should not bar an emergency medical technician from pursuing a cause of action against a negligent driver for injuries sustained while rendering aid to the victim of an automobile accident. Chief Justice Abrahamson argued that the majority's conclusion that permitting the EMT to recover places an “unreasonable burden” on drivers and would have “no sensible or just stopping point” is asserted without adequate explanation or justification. She contended that negligence law already imposes liability for greater burdens and more remote injuries than those at issue, and the usual rules of negligence are sufficient to address the majority's concerns. She expressed troubling reservations about the wide array of paid employees and volunteers to whom the majority’s reasoning could be applied, questioning if doctors, nurses, teachers, or private-sector safety supervisors would also be barred from recovery. Chief Justice Abrahamson emphasized that the holding creates complete immunity for a tortfeasor based solely on the plaintiff’s occupation, which is contrary to the general legal principle that a causally negligent tortfeasor is rarely relieved of liability. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joined this dissent.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and expands the scope of Wisconsin's public policy-based “firefighter’s rule,” firmly establishing its application to EMTs and negligent automobile collisions, not just firefighters and fires. It underscores the court's commitment to the public policy rationale of preventing unreasonable burdens on everyday actors for the inherent risks professional rescuers are trained to address. The narrow carving out of exceptions for independent acts of negligence, however, creates a crucial boundary, ensuring that rescuers are not completely barred from recovery for all injuries at an emergency scene. This decision likely impacts future cases by requiring courts to carefully distinguish between the initial negligence that creates the emergency and any subsequent, independent acts of negligence that may injure a professional rescuer.
