Pinkney v. State
2011 WL 5600041, 74 So.3d 572, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 18473 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under Florida law, the intent element for the crime of assault is satisfied by proof that the defendant committed an intentional act that was substantially certain to create a well-founded fear of imminent violence in the victim. The State is not required to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to do violence to the victim.
Facts:
- Two police officers, including Officer Zammitt, identified a parked Chevy Malibu that was the subject of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out alert).
- As a passenger was getting into the car, Officer Zammitt ordered him to the ground at gunpoint.
- The driver of the car, Emerson J. Pinkney, then put the vehicle in reverse.
- Officer Zammitt was standing approximately five to ten feet away, slightly behind and to the right of the car.
- Pinkney rapidly accelerated the car backwards, directly toward Officer Zammitt.
- Officer Zammitt had to move quickly to avoid being struck by the car, and testified he was afraid he was going to be hit.
- Pinkney then drove forward, struck another police car, and fled the scene, initiating a high-speed chase.
- After crashing the car, Pinkney fled on foot but was later identified by blood samples left in the vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida charged Emerson J. Pinkney in a state trial court with aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, among other charges.
- At the close of the State's case at trial, Pinkney moved for a judgment of acquittal on the aggravated assault charge, arguing the State failed to prove he had the specific intent to do violence.
- The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.
- A jury subsequently convicted Pinkney on all counts.
- Pinkney, as appellant, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault to the Florida Second District Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion.
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Issue:
Does the crime of assault under Florida Statute § 784.011(1) require the State to prove a specific intent to do violence to the victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Kelly, J.
No. The crime of assault does not require proof of a specific intent to do violence; it requires proof of an intentional threat that creates a well-founded fear of imminent violence. The court clarified that the word 'intentional' in the assault statute applies to the 'threat,' not the 'violence.' Therefore, the State must prove the defendant committed a voluntary act that was substantially certain to put the victim in fear of imminent violence. Here, Pinkney's act of rapidly reversing his car toward Officer Zammitt was substantially certain to create such fear, regardless of whether his ultimate motive was to escape rather than to hit the officer. The court explicitly receded from its prior holding in State v. Shorette, which had erroneously required proof of an intent to do violence.
Dissenting - Davis, J.
No. While the dissent agrees with the majority's clarification of the law and its decision to recede from Shorette, it argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove an 'intentional threat.' The dissent contends that the evidence of Pinkney's knowledge of Officer Zammitt's location was entirely circumstantial and did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence—that Pinkney was focused on fleeing Officer Knick at his driver's side door and did not see Officer Zammitt behind him. Without proof that Pinkney knew the officer was in his path, the State could not prove he intentionally threatened him. The dissent also argues that the majority's reasoning relies on an impermissible stacking of inferences: first inferring knowledge of the officer's location, and from that, inferring the intent to threaten.
Concurring - Villanti, J.
The concurrence agrees only with the portion of the majority and dissenting opinions that recedes from the prior decision in State v. Shorette. It takes no position on the application of the clarified law to the specific facts of Mr. Pinkney's case.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the mens rea (mental state) required for assault in Florida by rejecting the higher 'specific intent to do violence' standard from Shorette. By adopting a 'substantially certain to cause fear' standard, the court aligns assault with other general intent crimes, making it easier for the State to secure convictions. This holding shifts the legal focus from the defendant's subjective motivation (e.g., intent to harm) to the objective nature of the defendant's act and its likely effect on a victim. The ruling will impact cases where a defendant's actions are threatening but their ultimate goal, such as escape, is not necessarily to inflict physical harm.
