PINEGAR v. Harris
20 So. 3d 1081, 2008 La.App. 1 Cir. 1112, 2009 La. App. LEXIS 1123 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A homeowner is not liable for injuries to a minor guest when a household object is not unreasonably dangerous and the child is under the supervision of a parent, and neither res ipsa loquitur nor attractive nuisance typically applies. Furthermore, a statutory bar preventing an unemancipated minor from suing a custodial parent (La. R.S. 9:571) does not apply to children of unmarried parents and can be waived if not timely raised as a dilatory exception.
Facts:
- Brooklynn Pinegar, a four-year-old child, is the daughter of Jamie Pinegar Springman and Bradley Harris, who were never married but shared joint custody, with Ms. Springman as the primary custodial parent.
- On November 4, 2006, Brooklynn accompanied her father, Bradley Harris, on a social visit to Michael Cascio’s home in Baton Rouge.
- Mr. Harris gave Brooklynn a snack and seated her in a dining table chair in the dining room to watch cartoons on a television, which had a glass turtle bowl containing a pet turtle, 'Vinnie,' securely placed on top, approximately four to five feet from the floor.
- Mr. Harris then walked about ten steps into the adjoining living room, from which he had a clear view of Brooklynn, and began to watch a football game.
- Approximately ten seconds after Mr. Harris left her side, he heard a crash, ran to Brooklynn, and found her on the floor with lacerations to her face from the broken turtle bowl.
- Brooklynn later advised an emergency room physician that she pulled her chair closer to the television and stood on it to get a closer look at the turtle, and either struck the television or attempted to lift the bowl.
- Mr. Cascio had no reason to believe Brooklynn was not being adequately supervised by her father and had not been asked to assist in her supervision.
Procedural Posture:
- Jamie Pinegar Springman filed a petition for damages on March 8, 2007, in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany (trial court/court of first instance), naming Bradley Harris and Michael Cascio as defendants, alleging negligence.
- Ms. Springman subsequently amended her petition to add Farmers Insurance Exchange, Mr. Cascio’s liability insurer, as a defendant.
- Mr. Harris filed exceptions, including an objection to Ms. Springman's lack of procedural capacity; Ms. Springman was then appointed tutor of her daughter by the 22nd Judicial District Court and amended her petition to reflect her status as tutor.
- Mr. Cascio and Farmers answered the petition, denying liability.
- On January 25, 2008, Mr. Cascio and Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims against them.
- On March 20, 2008, Mr. Harris filed a dilatory exception of prematurity, objecting to the petition on the grounds that La. R.S. 9:571 prohibited a suit on behalf of an unemancipated child against a custodial parent.
- On March 31, 2008, Ms. Springman amended her petition a third time, alleging new theories including attractive nuisance and res ipsa loquitur.
- On April 14, 2008, the trial court heard the motion for summary judgment and the dilatory exception of prematurity.
- The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment for Mr. Cascio and Farmers and sustained Mr. Harris’s dilatory exception of prematurity.
- Ms. Springman (appellant) appealed both judgments to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
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Issue:
1. Does a homeowner owe a duty to a four-year-old social guest to secure a non-inherently dangerous object placed out of reach, and can the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur or attractive nuisance apply, when the child is under the immediate supervision of a parent? 2. Is a lawsuit on behalf of an unemancipated minor against an unmarried custodial parent premature under La. R.S. 9:571, and is the objection of prematurity waived if not raised in the initial dilatory exception?
Opinions:
Majority - Gaidry, J.
No, Michael Cascio did not breach a specific legal duty to Brooklynn, and neither the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur nor attractive nuisance applies under the circumstances. The court applied the duty-risk analysis for negligence, finding no evidence that the placement of the turtle bowl was unreasonably dangerous. The court rejected res ipsa loquitur because the circumstances were not so unusual as to infer negligence, Mr. Cascio did not have exclusive control over the chair, turtle bowl, or Brooklynn, and the circumstances alone did not mandate a conclusion of his breach of duty. The court also rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine because, while the turtle might attract a child's curiosity, neither the glass bowl nor its placement was inherently or unreasonably dangerous, and the doctrine requires a hidden trap or inherently dangerous instrumentality. The court concluded that life is full of risk, but not every risk is unreasonable and actionable, especially when the child was under her father's supervision. Yes, the trial court erred in sustaining the dilatory exception of prematurity by Bradley Harris. The court held that, according to the strict terms of La. R.S. 9:571, an unemancipated minor child of unmarried parents is not procedurally barred from suing either parent, even the custodial one, as the statute specifically addresses married or divorced parents. Furthermore, Mr. Harris procedurally waived his objection of prematurity by failing to raise it in his original dilatory exception, where he only raised lack of procedural capacity.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of premises liability in Louisiana, establishing that homeowners are not strictly liable for injuries caused by common household items that are not unreasonably dangerous, particularly when a child guest is under parental supervision. It reinforces the narrow applicability of res ipsa loquitur and attractive nuisance doctrines. Additionally, the ruling provides a strict interpretation of La. R.S. 9:571, creating a procedural distinction regarding suits against parents based on their marital status and emphasizing the importance of timely asserting dilatory exceptions to avoid waiver.
