Pinder v. Johnson
54 F.3d 1169, 1995 WL 320571 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A police officer's promise to protect a citizen from a private actor does not create a "special relationship" under the Due Process Clause giving rise to a constitutionally-mandated affirmative duty to protect, and where such a duty is not clearly established, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.
Facts:
- Don Pittman, Carol Pinder's ex-boyfriend, broke into her home, where he was abusive, violent, and threatened to murder Pinder and her children.
- A neighbor subdued Pittman until Officer Donald Johnson arrived and arrested him.
- Pinder informed Officer Johnson that Pittman had threatened her in the past and had recently been released from prison for attempting to set fire to her house.
- Concerned for her family's safety, Pinder asked Johnson if it would be safe for her to return to work that evening.
- Officer Johnson assured Pinder that Pittman would be locked up overnight and that a warrant could not be sworn out until the next morning.
- Relying on Johnson's assurances, Pinder returned to her job, leaving her three children at home.
- That same evening, Johnson charged Pittman with only misdemeanor offenses, and a county commissioner released Pittman on his own recognizance.
- Upon his release, Pittman returned to Pinder's house, set it on fire, and killed her three children who were asleep inside.
Procedural Posture:
- Carol Pinder sued Officer Donald Johnson and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Officer Johnson, the defendant, moved for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified immunity.
- The district court, a court of first instance, denied Officer Johnson's motion for summary judgment.
- Johnson, as appellant, filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- A divided three-judge panel of the intermediate appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding against Johnson.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to reconsider the panel's decision.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's express promise to protect a citizen from a known danger posed by a third party create a 'special relationship,' thereby giving rise to a clearly established affirmative duty to protect under the Due Process Clause, such that the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for a failure to protect?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Wilkinson
No. A police officer's promise does not create a special relationship giving rise to a clearly established affirmative duty to protect under the Due Process Clause, and therefore the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs. established that the Due Process Clause generally does not impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from private violence. An exception exists for a 'special relationship' when the state takes a person into its custody and restrains their liberty, rendering them unable to care for themselves. Pinder was not in state custody. The DeShaney court explicitly rejected the idea that an affirmative duty arises from the state's knowledge of a danger or its 'expressions of intent to help.' Promises do not create custody; therefore, no special relationship was formed, and no clearly established constitutional right was violated.
Dissenting - Judge Russell
Yes. The officer's actions created a special relationship and a clearly established duty to protect, making qualified immunity inappropriate. This was not a mere failure to act; Officer Johnson affirmatively created a danger or rendered Pinder and her children more vulnerable. By falsely assuring Pinder that Pittman would be jailed overnight, he induced her to rely on a false sense of security and leave her children unprotected. This affirmative misconduct, which increased the risk to the victims, falls under a well-established exception to the DeShaney rule. A reasonable officer would have understood that his actions created a duty to protect Pinder and her children, at least to the extent of warning her upon Pittman's release.
Concurring - Judge Widener
The author concurs in the judgment and most of the majority opinion but disagrees with three specific sentences on page 1177 related to the 'state-created danger' doctrine.
Concurring - Judge Motz
The author concurs in the judgment, holding that Officer Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in 1989. However, the author writes separately to state that the majority's broader policy discussion in Part V, suggesting that such a right should never exist, is erroneous dicta. The sole holding of the case is that a reasonable officer at the time would not have known his promise created a constitutional duty.
Concurring - Judge Hamilton
The author concurs in the judgment based on a straightforward application of qualified immunity. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney and prior circuit case law limiting the state's duty to protect to custodial situations, a reasonable officer would not have known that giving personal assurances to Pinder would violate her due process rights. Therefore, Officer Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the narrowness of the 'special relationship' exception established in DeShaney, effectively limiting it to custodial contexts like incarceration or institutionalization. By holding that an officer's explicit promise of protection does not give rise to a constitutional duty, the court makes it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring § 1983 claims for failure to protect against private violence. The ruling strengthens the qualified immunity defense for law enforcement, emphasizing that a right must be established with a high degree of specificity for an officer to be held liable. It signals that courts should be reluctant to expand constitutional tort liability into areas of discretionary police conduct.
