Yes, the judge is immune and the police have a defense. Judges need to be able to make difficult decisions without worrying that the losing party will sue them personally. This 'judicial immunity' is a very old rule that protects our justice system, and the Civil Rights law didn't get rid of it. For police, it's not fair to expect them to predict which laws will be overturned by courts in the future. As long as an officer makes an arrest with a good reason ('probable cause') and honestly believes they are enforcing a valid law ('good faith'), they are protected from lawsuits. This is called 'qualified immunity.' Finally, just because the priests expected to be arrested doesn't mean they gave up their right to sue for an illegal arrest.

No, the judge should not automatically be immune. The Civil Rights law says 'every person' who violates someone's rights can be sued. 'Every person' should include judges, especially since the law was passed because some state officials, including judges, were part of the problem. While judges shouldn't be sued for honest mistakes, they shouldn't be protected if they intentionally and knowingly break the law to violate someone's constitutional rights. The law's plain words shouldn't be ignored.

Yes, judges are protected. The law has long said that judges cannot be sued for their court decisions. This protects the public's interest in having independent judges who can make decisions without fear of being sued, even if the judge acts wrongly on purpose. 

No, police officers are not completely protected, but they may have some defense. If an officer arrests someone in good faith, believing the law allows the arrest, the officer should not be liable for violating civil rights, even if a court later finds the law unconstitutional. The officer's actions have to be reasonable, based on the idea that people are responsible for the expected outcomes of what they do.

I don't agree that judges should always be protected from lawsuits, no matter how badly they behave. The Court's decision isn't necessary to keep the courts independent, isn't required by the traditional rules of immunity for judges, and doesn't necessarily follow from the Court's previous decisions.

The civil rights law clearly says that 'every person' who violates someone's rights can be sued. Congress knew that some judges were part of the problem the law aimed to fix. 

Protecting judges from lawsuits isn't necessary for an independent judiciary. It's wrong to let judges get away with intentionally violating people's rights. There's a difference between an honest mistake and knowingly, purposefully depriving someone of their constitutional rights. Congress decided it's better to allow some lawsuits than to let bad actions go unpunished.

"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction."

Judges are absolutely immune "from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction."

—the Court held that the defense of good faith and probable cause was available to police officers in an action under § 1983.

"The purpose of judicial immunity is for benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences....[A judge's] errors may be corrected on appeal, but [she] should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound [her] with litigation charging malice or corruption."

Moreover, it is well established that judges enjoy absolute immunity from claims arising from any acts committed within their judicial functions.

Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making, but to intimidation.

"Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause."

Judicial immunity is applicable in suits under section 1983 because the "legislative record [gave] no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities

—the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether immunity was available to police officers under § 1983.

—we found that absolute immunity for judges was "equally well established" at common law, so that Congress "would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine" for suits under § 1983.

Yes. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not abolish the well-established common-law immunities for judges and police officers. First, judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. This immunity is not for the benefit of a malicious judge, but for the public's interest in an independent judiciary that can make decisions without fear of personal consequences. Congress did not explicitly abolish this firmly rooted doctrine in § 1983, and the Court presumed it intended for the immunity to remain, consistent with its holding on legislative immunity in Tenney v. Brandhove. Second, police officers are entitled to a defense of good faith and probable cause. An officer who arrests someone with probable cause under a statute they reasonably believe to be valid should not be held liable for false arrest simply because the statute is later declared unconstitutional. Section 1983 must be read against the background of common-law tort liability, which provided such a defense. Finally, the clergymen's expectation of being arrested does not constitute consent to an illegal arrest and does not bar their right to seek damages for the violation of their constitutional rights.

No. The plain language of § 1983, which applies to 'every person,' does not support a judicially created exception for judges. The statute was enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 precisely because state actors, including judges, were failing to protect civil rights. The legislative history reveals that Congress was aware that judges were part of the problem and that opponents of the bill specifically objected to its application to the judiciary, yet no exception was written into the law. While judges should not be liable for honest mistakes, absolute immunity is not necessary and shields judges who knowingly and intentionally deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. Such intentional misconduct is incompatible with the judicial function and should be subject to redress under the statute as Congress intended.

Yes. The common law doctrine of judicial immunity is well-established and was not abolished by § 1983, because the statute does not clearly indicate that Congress intended to do so. The immunity applies even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly, because it is a judge's duty to exercise their independent judgment without fear of consequences. The benefit of the immunity is for the public interest in having judges who are at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences, not for the protection of the malicious or corrupt judge. 

No. Police officers are not entitled to absolute immunity, but they should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid. Under the prevailing view, a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the same consideration would seem to require excusing the officer from liability for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional. Part of the background of tort liability makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. The officers have a limited privilege under the common law of Mississippi, and the Court of Appeals indicated that it would have recognized a similar privilege under § 1983 except that it felt compelled to hold otherwise by the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape. However, Monroe v. Pape presented no question of immunity and none was decided.

I do not believe that all judges should be absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 no matter how outrageous their conduct. The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions.

The statute's language and purpose is clear - it makes liable 'every person' who under color of law deprives another of their civil rights. To most, 'every person' would mean every person, not every person except judges. The congressional record shows that Congress intended to provide a remedy for the deprivation of civil rights, and recognized that certain members of the judiciary were implicated in the lawlessness that the statute aimed to rectify. 

The immunity granted today is not necessary to preserve an independent judiciary. The speculative inhibiting effects of holding judges liable do not outweigh the evils of allowing intentional deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed. Imposing liability for honest judicial mistakes is different from making a judge liable for the knowing and intentional deprivation of constitutional rights. Congress concluded that the evils of allowing such intentional deprivations to go unredressed outweighed any inhibiting effects.

Pierson et al. v. Ray et al.

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