Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
2009 ME 67, 974 A.2d 286, 2009 Me. LEXIS 71 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Maine's common law doctrine of charitable immunity protects charitable organizations from liability for claims of negligence (unless waived by insurance), but it does not extend to shield them from liability for intentional torts. The state's charitable immunity statute, 14 M.R.S. § 158, is a limitation on the doctrine, not an expansion of it to cover intentional torts.
Facts:
- In the late 1980s, William Picher was a minor.
- During this period, Raymond Melville, a priest employed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, sexually abused Picher.
- Picher alleged the Bishop was on notice that Melville had abused another child before Melville was ordained and assigned to the parish where the abuse of Picher occurred.
- Picher further alleged that the Bishop concealed Melville’s known propensities from parishioners and the public and failed to report him to law enforcement officials.
- The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland is a non-profit corporation sole.
- During the time of the alleged abuse, the Bishop held insurance policies that contained a 'Sexual Misconduct Exclusion,' which stated that sexual or physical abuse did not constitute a personal injury under the policy and any related claim was excluded.
Procedural Posture:
- William Picher sued Raymond Melville and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland in the Superior Court (Kennebec County), a state trial court.
- Defendant Melville defaulted on the claims against him.
- The Bishop filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense of charitable immunity against all of Picher's claims.
- The Superior Court granted the Bishop's motion for summary judgment, ruling that charitable immunity covered both intentional and negligent torts and had not been waived by insurance.
- After a damages hearing, a final judgment exceeding $4 million was entered against Melville.
- Picher, as appellant, appealed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bishop, as appellee, to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
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Issue:
Does Maine's common law doctrine of charitable immunity, as informed by statute 14 M.R.S. § 158, protect a charitable organization from liability for an intentional tort, such as fraudulent concealment?
Opinions:
Majority - Silver, J.
No, Maine's doctrine of charitable immunity does not protect a charitable organization from liability for an intentional tort. The court holds that charitable immunity is not available as a defense to intentional torts. The court's reasoning is threefold: 1) Charitable immunity is a discredited judicial doctrine that has been abandoned or limited by a vast majority of jurisdictions, and no state has ever applied it to intentional torts. To do so would make Maine a significant outlier. 2) The Legislature did not intend to expand the scope of common law charitable immunity when it enacted 14 M.R.S. § 158. The legislative history shows the statute, with its 'or any other tort' language, was intended to limit, not expand, the pre-existing common law doctrine which had only been applied to negligence. 3) The court has consistently maintained but refused to expand the doctrine, leaving its potential abrogation to the Legislature. Refusing to extend it to intentional torts is consistent with this precedent. The court affirmed, however, that immunity does apply to the negligence claims because the Bishop's insurance policy contained a clear exclusion for claims arising from sexual misconduct, meaning immunity was not waived for those specific claims.
Dissenting - Alexander, J.
Yes, Maine's charitable immunity doctrine, as codified by the legislature, should protect a charitable organization from liability for intentional torts. The plain language of the statute, 14 M.R.S. § 158, which grants immunity 'for negligence or any other tort,' is unambiguous and must be interpreted to include intentional torts. The majority's decision effectively reads the phrase 'or any other tort' out of the statute, violating basic rules of statutory construction. By doing so, the court invades the province of the Legislature, which is the proper body to make such a significant policy change. This judicial amendment effectively ends charitable immunity in Maine, as any plaintiff can now bypass the defense by simply pleading an intentional tort, exposing vital community organizations to the ruinous costs of litigation that the doctrine was established to prevent.
Concurring - Saufley, C.J.
No, the Legislature did not intend for charitable immunity to cover intentional torts. This case presents a conflict between the plain text of a specific phrase ('any other tort') and the overall context and legislative history of the statute. The statute as a whole was intended to limit charitable immunity, not expand it. It is implausible that the Legislature, without any specific debate, intended to immunize a charity for the intentional act of placing a known pedophile in a position of power over children. The context of the statute renders the phrase ambiguous, and the legislative history confirms there was no intent to expand immunity to such a degree. If the court has misinterpreted legislative intent, the Legislature remains free to clarify the statute.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of charitable immunity in Maine by establishing a clear judicial boundary between negligence and intentional torts. It prevents charitable organizations from using the immunity defense against claims of deliberate wrongdoing, such as fraud or concealment, potentially exposing them to greater liability in cases involving institutional cover-ups of abuse. The ruling aligns Maine with the vast majority of other states and reflects the judiciary's continued skepticism toward the anachronistic doctrine. While leaving the core immunity for negligence intact (pending legislative action), this precedent forces charities to defend against intentional tort claims on the merits, which will likely increase litigation costs for such organizations but may also foster greater institutional accountability.
