Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps
475 U.S. 767 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
In a defamation action brought by a private-figure plaintiff against a media defendant for speech of public concern, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving that the statements at issue are false.
Facts:
- Maurice S. Hepps was the principal stockholder of General Programming, Inc. (GPI), a corporation that franchised a chain of 'Thrifty' stores selling beer and snacks.
- Between May 1975 and May 1976, the Philadelphia Inquirer, owned by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., published a series of five articles.
- The articles' general theme was that Hepps and the Thrifty chain had links to organized crime.
- The articles alleged that these organized crime connections were used to improperly influence Pennsylvania's state government and its Liquor Control Board.
- Specific claims included that federal investigators found connections between Thrifty and 'underworld figures' and that the chain received special treatment from the state government.
Procedural Posture:
- Maurice Hepps and other plaintiffs sued Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. for defamation in a Pennsylvania state trial court.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court judge instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that the newspaper articles were false.
- The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
- The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court, holding that placing the burden of proving truth on the media defendant was constitutional, and remanded the case for a new trial.
- Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., the defendant-appellant, then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state law that presumes falsity and places the burden of proving truth on a media defendant in a defamation case involving a private figure and matters of public concern violate the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
Yes. In cases where a private-figure plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving that the speech at issue is false. The common law presumption that defamatory speech is false is unconstitutional in this context. In cases where the truth or falsity of a statement cannot be definitively proven, the Constitution requires that the scales be tipped in favor of protecting true speech. Placing the burden on media defendants to prove truth would create a 'chilling effect' on speech of public importance, as fear of being unable to prove the truth in court would deter the publication of speech that is, in fact, true. This holding builds upon Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which required private-figure plaintiffs to prove fault, and is necessary to provide the 'breathing space' that freedom of expression requires.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. The First Amendment does not prohibit a state from placing the burden of proving truth on a media defendant in a defamation suit brought by a private individual. The majority's decision wrongly undervalues the strong state interest in protecting the reputation of private citizens. This ruling primarily benefits publishers who have acted negligently or maliciously, as the plaintiff must already prove fault under Gertz. The Court's reasoning, which is derived from cases involving public figures, is misapplied to private figures who are more vulnerable to reputational injury and more deserving of legal redress. Deliberate, malicious character assassination by means of unprovable statements should not receive constitutional protection.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes. The First Amendment requires any plaintiff—whether a public official, public figure, or private individual—to prove the falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement that is of public concern. I join the Court's opinion but write separately to reiterate my view that a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants is irreconcilable with the First Amendment. The value of speech for informing the public does not depend on the identity of its source.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant constitutionalization of defamation law, shifting a key element of the common law to favor First Amendment protections. By placing the burden of proving falsity on the private-figure plaintiff (for speech of public concern), the Court extended the principles of Gertz and created a higher barrier for recovery in libel suits. This ruling prioritizes the prevention of a 'chilling effect' on public discourse over the state's interest in protecting individual reputation in cases where truth is uncertain. It solidifies a two-tiered analysis for defamation based on whether the speech involves a matter of public concern, making it much harder for plaintiffs to succeed in such cases against media defendants.
