Petriello v. Kalman
576 A.2d 474, 1990 Conn. LEXIS 209, 215 Conn. 377 (1990)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A hospital does not have a legal duty to obtain a patient's informed consent for a procedure performed by an independent physician, as that duty rests solely with the physician. A plaintiff who suffers a present injury that increases the risk of future harm may be compensated for that risk, to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur, even if it is not more probable than not.
Facts:
- Ann Petriello, who was 16 weeks pregnant, was admitted to Griffin Hospital under the care of her independent physician, Dr. Roy E. Kalman, for a suspected miscarriage.
- An ultrasound confirmed fetal death, and Kalman scheduled a dilatation and curettage (D&C) procedure.
- A hospital nurse administered preoperative medication to Petriello before Kalman had obtained her signed, informed consent, contrary to a hospital policy.
- After Petriello was medicated, Kalman arrived, explained the procedure, and had her sign the hospital's consent form.
- During the D&C, Kalman perforated Petriello's uterus and suctioned a portion of her small intestine.
- As a result of the injury, a general surgeon performed a bowel resection, removing approximately one foot of Petriello's intestine.
- This procedure caused adhesions, leaving Petriello with an 8 to 16 percent chance of suffering a future bowel obstruction.
Procedural Posture:
- Ann Petriello filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Roy E. Kalman and Griffin Hospital in a state trial court.
- At the close of all evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Griffin Hospital, concluding it had no duty regarding informed consent.
- The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Ann Petriello, against the defendant, Dr. Roy E. Kalman.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the directed verdict for the hospital to the state's highest court.
- The defendant, Dr. Kalman, as appellant, appealed the jury verdict against him to the same court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a tort action, may a plaintiff be awarded compensation for the increased risk of future harm resulting from a present injury, even if that harm is not more likely than not to occur?
Opinions:
Majority - Shea, J.
Yes. A plaintiff who has established a breach of duty that was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk of future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur. The court departs from the traditional 'all or nothing' rule, which required a plaintiff to prove a future consequence was 'more probable than not' (a greater than 50% chance) to recover damages. The court found this standard unjust, as it overcompensated plaintiffs for risks that never materialized while denying any recovery for substantial risks falling below the 50% threshold. By allowing compensation for the risk itself, proportional to its likelihood, the court creates a fairer system that compensates victims for the present uncertainty and danger they face. The court also held that the hospital had no duty to obtain or ensure informed consent, as this responsibility rested solely with Kalman, the independent physician. The hospital's internal policies did not create a legal duty to the patient but rather served as internal guidelines.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for abandoning the traditional 'all or nothing' rule for damages related to future harm, a standard followed by a majority of jurisdictions at the time. By allowing recovery for an increased risk of harm even when the probability is less than 51%, the court establishes a new, more nuanced precedent for calculating damages in personal injury cases. This holding directly impacts how future consequences of an injury are valued, shifting the focus from the certainty of the outcome to the value of the lost chance or the present harm of the risk itself. This approach requires expert testimony on statistical probabilities and provides a path to recovery for plaintiffs with substantial but statistically uncertain future health risks.
