Petran v. Allencastre
985 P.2d 1112, 91 Haw. 545 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The existence of publicly recorded conveyances evidencing a cotenancy may render a possessing cotenant's belief that no cotenancy exists objectively unreasonable, thereby precluding them from using the 'no reason to suspect' exception to the rule requiring actual notice for an adverse possession claim against other cotenants.
Facts:
- In 1849, King Kamehameha III granted a 180-acre parcel of land (RPG 183) to William P. Alexander.
- In 1860, Alexander conveyed an 82.096-acre portion of that land (the Alexander portion) to thirteen grantees as tenants in common. This deed was recorded in the Bureau of Conveyances in 1861.
- Defendants-Appellants Dennis L. Kaluna and Goldie L. Naone are direct descendants of some of the original thirteen grantees.
- In 1936, after a series of confusing intermediate transfers, the Alexander portion was conveyed to E.J. Allencastre, Jr., the father of Plaintiff Jolenta Allencastre Petran.
- From 1938 until 1992, the Allencastre family exclusively possessed the property, building and operating a slaughterhouse, erecting fences and signs, raising cattle, and paying property taxes.
- In 1949, E.J. Allencastre obtained a 'Certificate of Title' report which certified he was the sole owner, but this report's title search only went back to the 1936 conveyance and did not disclose the original thirteen grantees.
- In 1983, E.J. Allencastre deeded a one-third interest in the property to Plaintiff Petran, who maintained that she and her predecessors never had any reason to believe a cotenancy existed.
- In 1996, in preparation for selling her interest, Petran obtained a new title report which revealed the 1860 conveyance to the thirteen grantees and concluded their heirs owned the property as tenants in common.
Procedural Posture:
- Jolenta Allencastre Petran filed a complaint to quiet title and for partition in the Second Circuit Court of Hawaii.
- Petran moved for summary judgment, claiming ownership of the 'Alexander portion' of the property through adverse possession.
- Defendants Dennis L. Kaluna and Goldie L. Naone opposed the motion, arguing they were cotenants who had not received the required actual notice of the adverse claim.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Petran, finding she and the other Allencastres were the sole owners of the entire property.
- Kaluna and Naone, as appellants, appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.
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Issue:
Under the rule established in City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, may a cotenant claiming title by adverse possession be excused from the actual notice requirement under the 'no reason to suspect a cotenancy exists' exception when conveyances showing the cotenancy are a matter of public record?
Opinions:
Majority - Acoba, J.
No. A cotenant claiming adverse possession cannot be excused from the actual notice requirement under the 'no reason to suspect' exception if their belief in sole ownership is objectively unreasonable, and publicly recorded deeds evidencing the cotenancy may render such a belief unreasonable. The court applied the rule from City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, which establishes a general fiduciary relationship between cotenants, requiring a cotenant claiming by adverse possession to act in good faith. This good faith standard usually requires actual notice to other cotenants. An exception exists where the possessor has 'no reason to suspect' a cotenancy exists, but this standard has both a subjective component (the possessor's actual belief) and an objective component (the reasonableness of that belief). The court reasoned that a possessor 'ought to have known' of a cotenancy if evidence, such as recorded deeds, exists in public records. Because the 1860 deed creating the cotenancy was publicly recorded, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Allencastres' belief in their sole ownership was objectively reasonable. The incomplete 1949 title report was insufficient to establish an objectively reasonable belief. Therefore, summary judgment was improper, and the case is remanded for a trial to determine whether, under all the circumstances, Petran and her predecessors had no reason to suspect the cotenancy existed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'no reason to suspect' exception to the actual notice requirement for adverse possession among cotenants. It establishes that a possessing cotenant has a duty of inquiry and cannot claim ignorance of what a reasonable search of public records would reveal. This holding strengthens the property rights of out-of-possession cotenants, particularly in cases involving complex or old title histories, by making it more difficult for the possessing cotenant to extinguish their interests without providing actual notice. The case effectively imputes constructive knowledge of public records to the adverse claimant, raising the bar for satisfying the good faith standard articulated in Bennett.
