Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.
588 F.3d 838, 2009 WL 3818826, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25183 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality incurs liability under § 1983 for an employee's constitutional violation only if the violation resulted from an official policy or custom that was the moving force behind the injury, and not under a theory of respondeat superior. To establish such a custom, a plaintiff must demonstrate a pattern of sufficiently numerous, similar incidents that occurred for so long or so frequently as to constitute an accepted municipal practice, providing relevant context such as department size and total arrests.
Facts:
- On the night of August 14, 2005, Kevin Peterson and his wife, Jodi, after consuming alcohol, decided to sleep in their extended-cab pick-up truck in a Fort Worth parking lot rather than drive home.
- Around 5:00 a.m., Fort Worth Police Officers Samantha Horner and Roger Ballard responded to a security guard's call about two people sleeping in a truck.
- Officer Horner attempted to wake Peterson, who was in the back of the truck, by shaking his leg and tapping his sternum; Peterson responded by kicking at her, telling her to leave him alone, swatting at her, and hitting her forearm.
- Officers Horner and Ballard then removed Peterson from the truck, wrestled him to the ground, and handcuffed him.
- After Peterson was handcuffed and standing against the truck, Officer Ballard allegedly delivered a hard knee strike to Peterson’s thigh.
- Peterson was subsequently uncuffed and released after a background check, but his leg was severely injured, later diagnosed as a ruptured femoral artery requiring two surgeries and a nearly two-week hospital stay.
Procedural Posture:
- Kevin Peterson filed a § 1983 action against the City of Fort Worth in federal district court, alleging Fourth Amendment violations for unlawful detention and excessive force.
- The federal district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding neither a constitutional violation nor municipal liability.
- Peterson appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a city incur municipal liability under § 1983 for the alleged excessive force of its police officers when the plaintiff presents evidence of 27 complaints of excessive force over a four-year period, but fails to provide contextual information regarding the police department's size or total number of arrests?
Opinions:
Majority - E. Grady Jolly
No, the City of Fort Worth does not incur municipal liability because, while there was sufficient evidence to establish Peterson's excessive force claim, he failed to show that a policy or custom of the City was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. The Court agreed with the district court that Peterson's initial detention was lawful under Terry v. Ohio, as officers had specific and articulable facts (unresponsive individuals in a truck, early morning, unlocked doors, safety concerns) to warrant the intrusion. However, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding Peterson's excessive force claim, specifically the knee strike, because Peterson testified it occurred after he was handcuffed, and Officer Ballard's own testimony suggested it was unnecessary. Regarding municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., the Court reiterated that a city is not liable under a theory of respondeat superior but requires an official policy, promulgated by a municipal policymaker, that was the moving force behind the violation. The Court rejected Peterson's various theories of liability: 1. Ratification: The Court found the facts did not present an "extreme factual situation" required for ratification. A policymaker merely defending or failing to discipline subordinates for conduct later shown to be unlawful does not automatically incur municipal liability. 2. Failure to Train/Supervise: Peterson failed to show the City was deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for training on knee strikes. There was no evidence the City was aware of a risk of injury from knee strikes or a pattern of previous constitutional violations, and the department otherwise provided extensive training on the use of force. Any failure to reprimand Officer Horner for faulty record-keeping did not, by itself, raise a genuine issue of material fact on inadequate supervision. 3. Widespread Custom: The 27 complaints of excessive force over four years were deemed insufficient to establish a widespread custom representing official policy. Peterson failed to provide crucial context, such as the size of the Fort Worth Police Department or the total number of arrests during that period. Without this context, the incidents could not be shown to constitute a "pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case," and holding the City liable would effectively impose respondeat superior liability, which Monell prohibits.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Montalvo
Yes, there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning municipal liability, and the district court's summary judgment should be reversed and remanded for trial. Justice Montalvo agreed with the majority that Peterson's detention was lawful but that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding excessive force. However, the dissent argued that the majority held Peterson to a higher standard than required at summary judgment for municipal liability. 1. Ratification: The dissent found sufficient evidence for a jury question on ratification, including Chief Mendoza's deposition testimony that a lack of discipline for excessive force could be construed as tacit approval, Officer Horner's observation of the knee strike, Officer Ballard's view that a knee strike was unwarranted, and the fact that neither officer was disciplined. The dissent criticized the majority for making a "factual determination" that this was not an "extreme factual situation," arguing this should be left to a jury. The unpunished failure to enforce Use of Force reports, particularly Officer Horner’s failure to file one, could be seen as condoning non-compliance. 2. Failure to Train: The dissent argued there was sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute on failure to train. This evidence included Officer Ballard's testimony that he could not recall training on the risks of knee strikes, was disciplined for a prior taser incident on a handcuffed individual without retraining, and his training record showed no specific use-of-force courses since joining the department. Chief Mendoza's testimony that training concentrated on "where" to strike rather than the "repercussions" supported an inference of deliberate indifference. 3. Widespread Custom: The dissent contended that the 27 allegations of excessive force, over a five-year period, combined with Chief Mendoza's testimony (suggesting an officer may use force even without a legal basis for arrest) and the police academy's maxim "If it makes you look good, but it’s not in your report, it didn’t happen," created a jury question. Unlike Pineda v. City of Houston, Peterson's claim was narrower (excessive force in "mild crimes" met with chain-of-command acquiescence). The dissent also criticized the majority for augmenting the record with information from the City's website about department size, which was not presented as evidence by the City, thus imposing an improper burden on Peterson.
Analysis:
This case underscores the stringent requirements for establishing municipal liability under § 1983, particularly when alleging a widespread custom of constitutional violations. Even when a potential constitutional violation by individual officers is identified, the court strictly enforces the Monell standard, requiring plaintiffs to provide comprehensive statistical context (such as departmental size and total arrests) to demonstrate that a pattern of incidents truly represents an official, unwritten policy rather than isolated misconduct. The ruling highlights the practical difficulty of proving Monell claims based on a "custom" theory and establishes that multiple allegations of misconduct, without adequate contextual data, will likely be insufficient to overcome summary judgment.
