Peters v. EAST PENN TWP. SCH. DIST.
182 Pa. Super. 116, 126 A.2d 802, 1956 Pa. Super. LEXIS 355 (1956)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Language in a deed such as 'as long as' creates a fee simple determinable, an estate that automatically terminates and reverts to the grantor or their heirs upon the cessation of the specified use, even without an express reverter clause.
Facts:
- On November 9, 1893, James F. Peters conveyed a quarter-acre of land to the East Penn Township School District.
- The deed's habendum clause stated the School District was 'to have and to hold the said piece of ground... as long as it is used for public school purposes.'
- The deed's warranty clause contained a similar limitation, promising to defend the title 'as long as it is used for public school purposes.'
- At a later date, the East Penn Township School District ceased using the property for public school purposes.
- The School District sought to sell the property and convey a fee simple title to a new buyer.
- Earl C. Peters is an heir of the original grantor, James F. Peters.
Procedural Posture:
- Earl C. Peters filed an action of ejectment against the East Penn Township School District in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County (the trial court).
- The parties submitted the case to the trial court on a 'case stated,' which is an agreed statement of facts.
- The trial court entered a special verdict in favor of the defendant, East Penn Township School District.
- Earl C. Peters, as appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the intermediate appellate court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the phrase 'as long as it is used for public school purposes' in a deed create a fee simple determinable that automatically terminates when the property ceases to be used for that purpose?
Opinions:
Majority - Rhodes, P.J.
Yes, the phrase creates a fee simple determinable that automatically terminates when the specified condition is no longer met. The court reasoned that while mere expressions of purpose do not limit a title, the words 'as long as' are technical words of duration that clearly express the grantor's intent to create a limited, determinable fee. Unlike phrases such as 'for school purposes only,' which have been held to be mere statements of purpose, the language 'as long as' directly connects the duration of the estate to the specified use. The court distinguished this case from those lacking such durational language and analogized it to devises to a widow 'so long as she remains my widow,' which are consistently held to create defeasible fees. The absence of an explicit reverter clause is not determinative, as a possibility of reverter is implied by the use of such clear, technical words of limitation.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the critical distinction in property law between words of purpose and words of duration. It establishes that phrases like 'as long as' are terms of art that create a fee simple determinable, reinforcing that a grantor's clear intent to limit an estate will be enforced even if it restricts alienability. The decision provides a clear interpretive rule for title examiners and future courts, clarifying that an explicit reverter clause is not necessary when such technical durational language is used. This precedent significantly impacts the interpretation of historical deeds and the resolution of title disputes involving conditional grants.
