Peters v. Cummins Mental Health, Inc.
790 N.E.2d 572, 2003 WL 21464637, 2003 Ind. App. LEXIS 1109 (2003)
Rule of Law:
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (IMMA) does not apply to claims of general negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress against a health care provider if the claimant was not a patient receiving services for their own benefit and did not suffer bodily injury or death, and the claim is not derivative of a patient's malpractice injury.
Facts:
- On March 21, 2000, Cummins Mental Health, Inc. (Cummins) prepared a Psychological Assessment of J.M., Peters' twelve-year-old son.
- The "Background Information" section of Cummins' assessment included a statement that J.M.'s mother, Janet Peters (Peters), was declared an "unfit mother" and J.M. was removed from her custody.
- This statement in Cummins' report was derived from a January 1999 Psycho-educational Evaluation, which also stated, "His mother was deemed to be an unfit parent."
- Donald Maw, J.M.’s custodial parent, was the initial source of the background information for these reports.
- In March 2000, Hendricks County social worker Trish Olmstead provided Peters with a copy of Cummins' Psychological Evaluation.
- Peters personally suffered severe emotional distress due to being labeled an "unfit" mother in Cummins' report.
Procedural Posture:
- On February 13, 2002, Janet Peters filed a lawsuit against Donald Maw and Cummins Mental Health, Inc. in trial court.
- Peters' complaint against Cummins alleged negligent failure to investigate before including information about her alleged unfitness as a parent, and that the false statement caused her severe emotional distress.
- On April 15, 2002, Cummins moved for summary judgment, arguing the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Peters' complaint had not been submitted to a medical review panel as required by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (Act).
- Cummins presented an affidavit verifying it was a qualified health care provider under the Act.
- On July 9, 2002, a summary judgment hearing was held by the trial court.
- On July 16, 2002, the trial court granted summary judgment to Cummins on all claims, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed Cummins with prejudice.
- Peters (appellant) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act apply to negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought by a non-patient who alleges personal emotional distress from a health care provider's report about her child, thus requiring the claim to be submitted to a medical review panel?
Opinions:
Majority - Bailey, Judge
No, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act does not apply to Peters' claims, and therefore, her complaint was not required to be submitted to a medical review panel. The court reasoned that the Act is intended for claims of "bodily injury or or death on account of malpractice" and defines "malpractice" as a tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services provided by a health care provider to a patient. The court found that Peters did not make a claim for bodily injury or death. Furthermore, the court emphasized that a physician-patient relationship is necessary to bring claims under the Act, and Cummins’ services were not rendered for Peters' benefit, as they were for her son J.M. The court cited Weldon v. Universal Reagents, Inc. for the necessity of a physician-patient relationship and that services not for the claimant's benefit do not constitute a patient relationship. The court also rejected the argument that Peters' claim was a "derivative" claim under the Act, referencing Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund v. Wolfe. Derivative claims arise from malpractice committed on the patient (the individual receiving health care services), such as a parent's loss of a child's services. Peters’ claim, however, was for her personal emotional distress from being labeled "unfit," not for an injury to her son or one derived from an injury to him. Citing Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc. v. Ray, the court affirmed that claims sounding in general negligence or premises liability, rather than medical malpractice, are outside the Act. Consequently, the trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, affirming that it is not an all-encompassing shield for health care providers against all types of claims. It establishes that claims of general negligence or intentional torts that do not involve bodily injury or death, or a direct physician-patient relationship for the claimant's benefit, fall outside the Act's purview. This has significant implications for plaintiffs, as it dictates whether they must undergo the often lengthy and complex medical review panel process before filing suit, and for health care providers, as it defines the boundaries of their protected status under the Act. Future cases will likely rely on this distinction between "medical malpractice" involving a patient-provider relationship for the patient's benefit and general tort claims.
