Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney

Supreme Court of United States
442 U.S. 256 (1979)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A facially gender-neutral statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment solely because it has a disproportionate adverse impact upon one sex, unless that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.

Facts:

Massachusetts enacted a statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 23, granting an absolute hiring preference to qualified veterans for state civil service positions.
Helen B. Feeney, a nonveteran, was a long-time public employee in Massachusetts.
Feeney achieved high scores on several competitive civil service examinations for promotion.
Despite her high scores, Feeney was ranked below male veterans who had scored lower than her, which prevented her from being certified as eligible for the positions she sought.
Due to historical federal military enlistment policies, over 98% of veterans in Massachusetts were male.
The statutory definition of "veteran" was gender-neutral, and the preference applied to any person, male or female, who met the criteria.
The class of nonveterans disadvantaged by the preference included a significant number of men.

Procedural Posture:

Helen B. Feeney filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging the veterans' preference statute was unconstitutional.
A three-judge panel of the District Court ruled in favor of Feeney, finding the statute unconstitutional.
The Attorney General of Massachusetts, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Washington v. Davis.
On remand, the District Court reaffirmed its original judgment, concluding that the preference was inherently nonneutral and its discriminatory consequences were too inevitable to be unintended.
The Attorney General of Massachusetts, as appellant, again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does a state's absolute lifetime preference for veterans in civil service employment, which is facially gender-neutral but has a severe and foreseeable disproportionate adverse impact on women, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stewart

No, the state's absolute preference for veterans does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. To prove a constitutional violation for a facially neutral law, a plaintiff must show a discriminatory purpose, not just a disparate impact. The court applied a two-part inquiry: first, whether the classification is genuinely neutral, and second, whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. The court found the statute was not a pretext for gender discrimination, as the distinction it draws is between veterans and nonveterans, not men and women. The nonveteran class is composed of both men and women. The history of the statute shows its purpose was to reward veterans for their service, not to exclude women. The court held that "discriminatory purpose" implies that the legislature acted at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," the law's adverse effects on women. Feeney failed to demonstrate that the legislature's intent was to subordinate women in the civil service.

Dissenting - Justice Marshall

Yes, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. The dissent argued that when the discriminatory impact of a facially neutral law is as inevitable and extreme as it is here, an inference of discriminatory purpose is warranted. The statute inescapably reserves a major sector of public employment to a class that is 98% male, a consequence that was entirely foreseeable to the legislature. The dissent pointed to the law's historical exemption for job requisitions "especially calling for women" as evidence that the state was aware of the law's gendered impact and acted to perpetuate stereotypical female roles. Because less discriminatory alternatives existed (like a point-preference system), Massachusetts' choice of an absolute preference that so severely disadvantages women cannot be considered gender-neutral in purpose.

Concurring - Justice Stevens

No, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The concurrence agreed with the majority's conclusion, reasoning that the large number of men who were also disadvantaged by the veterans' preference refutes the claim that the law was intended to benefit males as a class over females. Because nearly two million men in Massachusetts were nonveterans and thus harmed by the statute, it could not be characterized as a law designed with the purpose of discriminating against women.

Analysis:

This case significantly solidified the 'discriminatory purpose' requirement established in Washington v. Davis for Equal Protection challenges to facially neutral laws. It makes it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in such cases based solely on evidence of a severe disparate impact, even when that impact was foreseeable. The Court's distinction between a legislature acting 'because of' versus 'in spite of' a law's adverse effects on a protected group created a high bar for proving unconstitutional intent. This precedent has had a profound effect on litigation in areas like employment, housing, and voting rights, where facially neutral policies often have disproportionate impacts on minority groups.

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