Perry v. S.N. and S.N.
973 S.W.2d 301 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person's violation of the Texas Family Code's mandatory child abuse reporting statute does not constitute negligence per se and therefore does not create a private civil cause of action for damages against the non-reporting individual.
Facts:
- B.N. and K.N. attended a day care center operated by Francis and Daniel Keller from March to August 1991.
- Their parents, S.N. and S.N., alleged that Daniel Keller regularly abused the children physically and sexually during this time.
- Francis Keller allegedly confided in her friend, Janise White, that Daniel Keller had 'abusive habits toward children.'
- In August 1991, the Kellers' friends, Douglas Perry, Janise White, and Raul Quintero, were visiting the Kellers' home, which adjoined the day care center.
- During this visit, Perry, White, and Quintero allegedly witnessed Daniel Keller take several children from the day care into the home and sexually abuse them.
- Perry, White, and Quintero did not intervene to stop the abuse nor did they report it to the police or child welfare authorities.
- The parents alleged that this failure to report allowed the day care to remain open and the abuse of their children to continue.
Procedural Posture:
- S.N. and S.N., individually and as next friends of their children, sued Douglas Perry, Janise White, and Raul Quintero in a Texas trial court.
- The plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, negligence per se for the defendants' failure to report child abuse.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment on common law negligence but reversed the summary judgment on the negligence per se claim, remanding it for trial.
- The defendants, as petitioners, sought and were granted a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Texas.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a person's violation of the Texas Family Code's criminal statute requiring the reporting of suspected child abuse constitute negligence per se, thereby creating a civil cause of action for damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Phillips
No, a violation of the Texas Family Code's criminal statute requiring the reporting of suspected child abuse does not constitute negligence per se. The court declined to adopt the criminal reporting statute as a standard for civil tort liability because doing so would not be fair, workable, or wise. The court's reasoning was based on a five-factor analysis. First, the statute would create a new tort duty where none exists at common law, which generally imposes no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of a third party. Second, the statute's standard for reporting—having 'cause to believe' that abuse 'may be' occurring—is not sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice of the required conduct in all situations. Third, applying negligence per se would impose potentially ruinous financial liability that is grossly disproportionate to the minor criminal penalty (a Class B misdemeanor) established by the legislature for failure to report. Fourth, the plaintiffs' injury is an indirect result of the statutory violation, with the causal chain being attenuated by the actions of both the abuser and the state authorities who would need to act on a report. While the statute does not impose liability without fault (as it requires a 'knowing' failure), the other factors weigh heavily against creating a new basis for civil liability.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the application of the negligence per se doctrine in Texas, particularly in cases of nonfeasance (failure to act). The court established that it will not readily create a new civil duty of care from a criminal statute, especially when no analogous common law duty exists. The ruling reinforces the distinction between criminal penalties intended to punish public wrongs and civil liability designed to compensate for private injuries. By refusing to impose potentially massive and indirect liability for a failure to report, the court signaled a reluctance to expand tort duties through statutory interpretation, leaving such policy decisions to the legislature or future development of the common law.
Unlock the full brief for Perry v. S.N. and S.N.