Perkins v. State
682 So.2d 1083, 1996 WL 627526 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Under Florida's burglary statute, the legal definition of a 'dwelling' is determined by whether the structure is designed for human habitation, not by its current occupancy status or the owner's intent to return.
Facts:
- The owner built a house in 1953 and lived in it for many years.
- Several months prior to the incident, the owner moved out of the house.
- The owner had no intention of returning to live in the house but intended to rent or sell it for someone else to live in.
- At the time of the break-in, the house was unoccupied but contained personal property, including a stove, refrigerator, washer, and microwave.
- The electricity to the house was on, although the water had been turned off.
- Houston D. Perkins burglarized this unoccupied house.
Procedural Posture:
- Houston D. Perkins was charged with burglary of a dwelling.
- Following a trial, Perkins was convicted in the trial court of burglary of a dwelling, a second-degree felony.
- Perkins, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the First District Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court), arguing the house was not a 'dwelling' under the statute.
- The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but certified a question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.
- The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question.
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Issue:
Does the statutory definition of a 'dwelling' in section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes, which focuses on a structure's design for occupation, supersede the common law definition that required actual occupancy or an intent to return?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The 1982 amendments to Chapter 810, Florida Statutes, supersede the common law definition of a dwelling. The court found that the statutory language in section 810.011(2) is clear and unambiguous. The statute defines a 'dwelling' as a building 'designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.' This language shifts the legal focus from the common law requirement of actual occupancy or the owner's intent to return ('animo revertendi') to the objective design and purpose of the structure. Because the statutory language is plain, the court must apply its plain and obvious meaning without resorting to prior common law definitions. Therefore, a house designed for habitation remains a dwelling for burglary purposes, regardless of whether it is temporarily vacant.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies and broadens the scope of what constitutes a 'dwelling' under Florida's burglary law, reflecting a departure from traditional common law principles. By establishing that a structure's design is paramount over its occupancy status, the ruling provides greater protection to owners of properties that are temporarily vacant, such as rental homes between tenants or houses for sale. This objective standard simplifies prosecution for burglary of a dwelling, as it removes the need to prove the owner's subjective intent to return. The case solidifies the legislature's authority to redefine common law crimes through clear statutory language.
