Perez v. Sharp
32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that prohibits marriage between individuals of different races violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as marriage is a fundamental right and racial classifications are inherently suspect.
Facts:
- Andrea Perez, a white person, and Sylvester Davis, a Negro, were residents of California.
- Perez and Davis were both members of the Roman Catholic Church.
- The Roman Catholic Church has no rule forbidding marriage between Caucasians and Negroes.
- Perez and Davis applied to the County Clerk of Los Angeles County for a license to marry.
- The County Clerk refused to issue the license to them.
- The clerk's refusal was based on California Civil Code section 69, which prohibited the marriage of a white person with a Negro.
Procedural Posture:
- Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis filed a petition in the Supreme Court of California, the state's highest court, for a writ of mandamus.
- The petition sought to compel the County Clerk of Los Angeles County to issue them a marriage license.
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Issue:
Do California Civil Code sections 60 and 69, which prohibit the issuance of a marriage license to a white person and a person of another specified race, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Traynor, J.
Yes. A state statute prohibiting marriage solely on the basis of race violates the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. Marriage is a fundamental right of free men, protected by the Due Process Clause, and any restriction on this right must serve an important social objective and be accomplished by reasonable means. The statutes in question restrict the right to marry on the basis of race alone, which is a classification that violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that the right to marry is an individual right, not a group right, so the argument that the law applies equally to all races is invalid as it still deprives individuals of their choice. Furthermore, the court found the state's justifications, such as preventing inferior offspring and reducing social tension, to be based on prejudice and without scientific support. Finally, the court held that the statutes were also unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, as the racial terms used are not defined and cannot be reasonably applied to persons of mixed ancestry.
Dissenting - Shenk, J.
No. The state statutes prohibiting interracial marriage are a valid exercise of the state's police power to regulate marriage for the general welfare. The power of a state to regulate the marital relationship has long been recognized, and similar anti-miscegenation laws have existed in California and numerous other states for nearly a century, consistently upheld by state and federal courts. The dissent argues that the court should defer to the Legislature's determination that such marriages are contrary to public policy, as there is a debatable factual basis, both biological and sociological, for the legislation. The law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it applies equally to all persons, restricting both white persons and Negroes from entering into such marriages. The claim of vagueness is not applicable to the petitioners, who clearly identified themselves as 'white' and 'Negro,' and thus lack standing to raise that challenge.
Concurring - Carter, J.
Yes. The statutes are the product of ignorance, prejudice, and intolerance, and they directly conflict with the fundamental American principle that all human beings have equal rights regardless of race, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution must be considered 'color-blind' in respect of civil rights. The right to marry the person of one's choice is a fundamental aspect of the pursuit of happiness. Any justification for these laws based on racial purity is repugnant to the core values for which the nation has fought wars, and arguments based on such theories, reminiscent of those in Hitler's 'Mein Kampf,' have no place in American jurisprudence.
Concurring - Edmonds, J.
Yes. The statutes are unconstitutional because they infringe upon the fundamental right of religious freedom, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Marriage is a fundamental right grounded in religious principles. Legislation that collides with First Amendment liberties is subject to a much stricter test than rational basis; it can only be restricted to prevent a 'grave and immediate danger' to interests the state may lawfully protect. The state has not demonstrated any such clear and present danger to justify these restrictions on the right to marry.
Analysis:
This was a groundbreaking decision by the California Supreme Court, becoming the first state high court in the 20th century to hold that an anti-miscegenation law violated the U.S. Constitution. It established marriage as a fundamental right subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny and recognized the suspect nature of racial classifications nearly two decades before the U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Loving v. Virginia (1967). The case provided a powerful legal framework for challenging similar laws across the country and marked a significant shift in American jurisprudence toward a more robust interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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