No. The Court said a 'notice to appear' isn't a real notice if it doesn't tell you when and where to appear. The law is very clear about this. It's just common sense: a notice to show up somewhere has to say *when and where*. Since the law is so clear, the Court didn't have to accept the government's different interpretation.

No. I agree completely with the main opinion. But I'm also worried that other courts were too quick to just agree with the government's lawyers without thinking for themselves. Courts are supposed to read the law carefully, not just automatically defer to a government agency's opinion. We should rethink how much we trust government agencies to interpret the law.

Yes. The law is confusing, so the courts should have trusted the government's expertise. A notice with some information missing is still a notice, just a flawed one. Think of a car with a missing wheel—it's still a car, just broken. The majority's decision will cause practical problems for the government, which can't always schedule a hearing right away.

The Supreme Court said that a notice to appear in immigration court must tell the immigrant when and where to go. If it doesn't have this information, it doesn't count as an official notice that stops the immigrant from building up time in the U.S. The Court said the law is clear that a real notice to appear needs a time and place. They said this makes sense, because the point of a notice is to let immigrants know when and where they need to be in court. The Court disagreed with the government's arguments that the law was unclear.

Justice Kennedy agreed with the decision but wrote separately to say he's worried about how courts are using a previous case called Chevron. That case said courts should defer to government agencies in interpreting unclear laws. Kennedy said some courts aren't looking carefully enough at whether laws are really unclear before deferring to agencies. He suggested the Supreme Court may need to rethink when and how courts defer to agency interpretations.

Justice Alito disagreed with the Court's decision. He argued that the law was not clear and that the immigration agency's interpretation was reasonable, so the Court should have deferred to it under the Chevron case. Alito said the Court relied too much on its own view of 'common sense.' He warned that the decision will cause problems by forcing the government to put fake dates and times on notices in the future. Alito thought the Court should have let the immigration agency's interpretation stand.

In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that "[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings is not a `notice to appear under section 1229 (a),'and so does not trigger the stop-time rule. "

In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a notice to appear (NTA) that does not designate the specific time and place for the first hearing "is not a `notice to appear under [8 USC § ] 1229 (a)[2012]'"and does not terminate the alien's period of continuous presence for purposes of cancellation of removal.

—confirming that notice to appear under § 1229 (a) "include [s]... the time and place of the removal proceedings

T] he Court need not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the interpretive question at hand

W] hen the term `notice to appear'is used elsewhere in the statutory section, including as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it the substantive time-and-place criteria required by § 1229 (a

—explaining that statutory language allowing the Government to change or postpone the removal proceedings to a new time or place "presumes that the Government has already served a `notice to appear'... that specified a time and place as required by § 1229 (a)(1)(G)(i

The Supreme Court relied on the statutory language of the stop-time rule, which states that the alien's physical presence ends "when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229 (a

Given the concerns raised by some Members of this Court it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision

No. A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a 'notice to appear under section 1229(a)' and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text of the statute is unambiguous. The stop-time rule in § 1229b(d)(1) expressly refers to a 'notice to appear under section 1229(a),' which in turn defines that notice as a written document 'specifying...[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.' Thus, to trigger the rule, the notice must contain this information. Common sense reinforces this conclusion, as a notice to appear must, at a minimum, provide the information necessary for the person to actually appear. Because the statutory language is clear, the Court does not need to defer to the agency's contrary interpretation under Chevron.

No. The majority opinion is correct and I join it in full. This case, however, illustrates a troubling trend in how lower courts apply Chevron deference. Several Courts of Appeals reflexively deferred to the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) interpretation without engaging in a rigorous analysis of the statutory text. This suggests an abdication of the Judiciary's proper role in interpreting federal statutes. It is necessary and appropriate for the Court to reconsider the premises of Chevron and how it has been implemented in a future case.

Yes. The statute is ambiguous, and the Court should have deferred to the BIA's reasonable interpretation under the Chevron framework. The phrase 'notice to appear under section 1229(a)' can be reasonably read to mean a notice authorized by that section, even if it is defective or incomplete. A defective notice is still a notice, just as a three-wheeled car is still a car. The majority's interpretation creates significant practical problems for the government, which often cannot know the specific hearing date when it initiates removal proceedings. The majority's 'common sense' reading is not the only permissible one, and under Chevron, the agency's reasonable choice should have been upheld.

The Supreme Court held that a notice to appear that does not inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceedings is not a 'notice to appear under section 1229(a)' and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule. The Court emphasized that the plain statutory text of §1229(a) requires a notice to appear to specify the time and place of removal proceedings in order to be valid. The Court also noted that this interpretation is supported by neighboring statutory provisions and common sense, as the essential purpose of a notice to appear is to provide notice of the information that would enable the noncitizen to appear at the removal hearing. The Court rejected the Government's and dissent's arguments that the statute was ambiguous, finding that the statutory language clearly supported Pereira's interpretation.

Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion expressing concern about the way Chevron deference has come to be understood and applied by the courts. He noted that some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis of whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress' intent could be discerned, and whether the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. Kennedy suggested that it may be necessary and appropriate, in an appropriate case, to reconsider the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.

Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have deferred to the BIA's interpretation of the statute under Chevron. Alito contended that the statutory language was ambiguous and that the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. He criticized the majority for relying on its own view of 'common sense' to reject the BIA's interpretation, noting that the majority's view was not the only reasonable interpretation. Alito warned that the Court's decision would have negative practical consequences, as it would force the Government to include arbitrary dates and times on future notices to appear. He concluded that the Court should have deferred to the BIA's interpretation under Chevron.

Pereira v. Sessions

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