People v. Zamora
1996 WL 350881, 940 P.2d 939 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Police use of deception does not per se invalidate a suspect's consent to a warrantless search. Instead, the deception is one factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consent was voluntary.
Facts:
- On May 4, 1993, a thirteen-year-old girl was abducted, taken to an apartment, and sexually assaulted.
- The victim provided police with a description of the apartment, including its location, messy layout, and the presence of an unfilled waterbed frame.
- Police investigation led them to the apartment of the defendant, Mark Zamora.
- When police arrived, Zamora exited his apartment, closed the door, and initially refused their request to enter, claiming it was too messy.
- Police then employed a ruse, falsely stating they were investigating a domestic dispute at an adjacent apartment and only wanted to see his apartment's layout.
- Believing the officers' stated purpose, Zamora consented and allowed them to enter.
- Once inside, officers observed that the apartment's layout matched the victim's description and saw the incriminating waterbed frame in plain view through an open door.
- Based on these observations, police prepared a photographic lineup from which the victim positively identified Zamora.
Procedural Posture:
- Following the initial entry and victim identification, police obtained a search warrant and arrested Mark Zamora.
- At trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the initial warrantless entry, arguing his consent was invalid due to police deception.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the consent was voluntary.
- A jury in the trial court convicted Zamora of second degree kidnapping and sexual assault on a child.
- Zamora (appellant) appealed the judgment of conviction to this intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does the use of a deceptive ruse by police to obtain consent for a warrantless entry into a home automatically render the consent involuntary and thus invalid under the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Rothenberg
No. The use of a deceptive ruse by police does not automatically render consent involuntary; it is one factor among the totality of the circumstances. Here, the court found the consent was voluntary because the police did not misrepresent their authority, feign an emergency, or engage in any threatening or overbearing conduct. Although the officers misrepresented their ultimate purpose, they were truthful in stating they wished to see the apartment's layout. The court distinguished this from cases where deception is used to circumvent a warrant requirement or where all material facts are deceptive. Under the totality of the circumstances test established in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, considering that Zamora knew he could refuse entry and was not pressured, the trial court's finding of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous.
Dissenting - Judge Taubman
Yes. When entry into a home is gained by a preconceived and material deception as to the police's purpose, consent in the constitutional sense is lacking. The dissent argues that the trial court's finding that Zamora would not have consented but for the deception should have been determinative. The ruse was a purposeful disregard for the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, especially given the absence of probable cause at the time. Citing McCall v. People, the dissent contends that such a material misrepresentation vitiates consent because it undermines the free and unconstrained choice necessary for a voluntary waiver of the right to be secure in one's home. The deception was not partial, but complete and material to the defendant's decision.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the application of the totality of the circumstances test for consent searches, even when consent is procured through police deception. It establishes that a ruse, on its own, does not automatically invalidate consent, giving law enforcement latitude in investigations as long as their conduct is not coercive. The case highlights the doctrinal tension between effective law enforcement techniques and the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home, as articulated by the dissent. Future legal challenges in this area will likely focus on defining the threshold at which a deception becomes so fundamentally unfair or material that it overbears the will of the suspect, rendering consent involuntary.
