People v. Zackowitz
254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a criminal prosecution, the State cannot introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit a crime through proof of other bad acts or crimes, unless the defendant first chooses to make their character an issue.
Facts:
- The defendant, Joseph Zackowitz, and his wife were walking home shortly after midnight when a group of four men, including Frank Coppola, were repairing an automobile.
- One of the men made an insulting comment to Zackowitz's wife.
- Zackowitz, who had briefly separated from his wife, returned to find her crying. He confronted the men, cursed at them, and threatened that if they didn't leave in five minutes, he would 'come back and bump them all off.'
- Zackowitz and his wife went to their nearby apartment, where she told him the specific insult: a man had offered her two dollars for sex.
- Enraged, Zackowitz returned to the scene, where the men were still working.
- An altercation ensued, during which Zackowitz kicked Coppola.
- Zackowitz then drew a .25 calibre automatic pistol and fired a single shot, killing Coppola.
- Zackowitz fled with his wife and threw the pistol into a river.
Procedural Posture:
- The State prosecuted Joseph Zackowitz in a New York trial court for the murder of Frank Coppola.
- During the trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence three pistols and a tear-gas gun found in Zackowitz's apartment, which were not the murder weapon.
- The defense objected to the admission of this evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the weapons as exhibits.
- The jury convicted Zackowitz of murder in the first degree.
- Zackowitz, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of evidence that a defendant possesses weapons unrelated to the charged crime, for the purpose of showing the defendant has a murderous disposition, violate the rule against character evidence and constitute reversible error?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardozo, Ch. J.
Yes, the admission of evidence that a defendant possesses weapons unrelated to the charged crime violates the rule against character evidence and constitutes reversible error. The fundamental rule of criminal evidence is that a defendant's character is never at issue unless the defendant chooses to make it so. The prosecution introduced evidence of three other pistols and a tear-gas gun found in Zackowitz's apartment, none of which were the murder weapon. The only purpose of this evidence was to persuade the jury that Zackowitz was a 'desperate type of criminal' with a 'murderous propensity.' This is impermissible character evidence, which the law excludes as a matter of policy to prevent the jury from convicting a defendant based on their perceived character rather than on proof of the specific crime charged. The evidence does not fall into any exception, such as proving preparation or identity, because the weapons were left at home and were unconnected to the commission of the crime.
Dissenting - Pound, J.
No, the admission of the evidence was not reversible error. The weapons were admissible because they were part of the 'history of the case' and the overall transaction. This evidence presented Zackowitz to the jury not as a man of generally dangerous disposition, but as one who, after making a threat, possessed an arsenal from which he could select a weapon to carry out that threat. Furthermore, the weapons corroborated Zackowitz's own confession in which he admitted to owning them. Even if the admission was a technical error, it was not substantial enough to have influenced the verdict, given the strong evidence of guilt and the fact that the proof 'merely darkened that which was black enough when painted by his own brush.'
Analysis:
This case is a foundational decision in American evidence law, powerfully reinforcing the prohibition against the use of propensity evidence by the prosecution. The court's holding makes clear that evidence of a defendant's other bad acts or criminal disposition is inadmissible if its primary purpose is to show that the defendant is the type of person who would commit the crime charged. This principle forces the prosecution to prove guilt based on evidence directly related to the crime itself, rather than by assassinating the defendant's character. The decision protects the presumption of innocence and ensures a defendant is tried for a specific act, not for who they are.
