People v. Young
183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1, 11 N.Y.2d 274 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
A person who intervenes to aid a third party does so at their own peril, and their mistaken but reasonable belief that the third party is being unlawfully assaulted is not a defense to an assault charge if the third party was, in fact, resisting a lawful arrest.
Facts:
- Two detectives, Driscoll and Murphy, who were not in uniform, observed a man named McGriff arguing with a motorist in the street.
- Detective Driscoll attempted to move McGriff out of the roadway to allow traffic to pass, but McGriff refused and caused a crowd to gather.
- After identifying himself to McGriff, Detective Driscoll placed him under arrest.
- McGriff resisted the arrest, leading to a physical struggle with the plainclothes officers.
- The defendant came out of the crowd, observing what he believed to be two men beating a younger man (McGriff).
- Believing McGriff was being unlawfully assaulted, the defendant intervened and struck Detective Murphy with his fist.
- In the ensuing struggle, Detective Driscoll's kneecap was injured.
- The defendant stated he did not know or think that Driscoll and Murphy were police officers.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was tried and convicted of assault in the third degree in the court of first instance.
- The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the conviction upon the law and dismissed the information.
- The People of New York appealed the Appellate Division's reversal to the Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is a defendant's mistaken but reasonable belief that they are defending a third person from an unlawful assault a valid defense to a charge of third-degree assault, when the supposed assailants are actually police officers making a lawful arrest?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A defendant may be properly convicted of third-degree assault for intervening in a lawful arrest, even if he acts under the mistaken but reasonable belief that he is protecting the arrestee from an unlawful assault. The court adopts the majority rule in American jurisdictions that one who goes to the aid of a third person does so at his own peril. The right of a person to defend another should not be greater than the other person's right to defend himself. Since McGriff was being lawfully arrested, he had no right to resist, and therefore the defendant had no right to intervene on his behalf. The charge of third-degree assault only requires proof that the defendant knowingly struck a blow; motive or mistake of fact is of no significance for this general intent crime.
Dissenting - Froessel, J.
Yes. A defendant's mistaken but reasonable belief that he is lawfully defending another should be a valid defense to an assault charge. Basic principles of criminal law require a 'mens rea,' or guilty mind, for criminal culpability. An honest and reasonable belief in circumstances that, if true, would make the act innocent negates criminal intent. It is illogical and contrary to New York public policy to recognize a reasonable mistake of fact as a defense for justifiable homicide but deny it for the lesser crime of simple assault. The majority's holding creates a rule that deters citizens from coming to the aid of those they reasonably believe are in imminent danger.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a strict, objective standard for the defense of others in New York, rejecting a more subjective, reasonableness-based approach. By holding that an intervenor acts 'at their own peril,' the court prioritizes the unimpeded execution of lawful arrests and public order over the good-faith intentions of a would-be rescuer. The ruling places the entire risk of mistake on the intervenor, potentially chilling bystander intervention in ambiguous situations. This creates a stark contrast with the state's justification defense for homicide, which does allow for a reasonable mistake of fact, setting up a potential inconsistency in how the law treats the use of non-lethal versus lethal force in defense of others.
