People v. Wood
538 N.W.2d 351, 450 Mich 399 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person is considered to be 'operating' a motor vehicle within the meaning of Michigan's OUIL statute if they have put the vehicle in motion or in a position posing a significant risk of causing a collision, and continue to do so until the vehicle is returned to a position posing no such risk, even if they are unconscious and the vehicle is stationary.
Facts:
- On the night of June 15, 1992, police officers found Andrew Russell Wood unconscious in his van at a McDonald’s drive-through window in Howell.
- Wood was slumped forward, with his head resting on the steering wheel.
- The vehicle’s engine was running, and the automatic transmission was in drive.
- Wood’s foot was resting on the brake pedal, which kept the vehicle from moving.
- Wood had a twenty-dollar bill in his hand, and a Budweiser beer between his legs.
- Wood smelled of alcohol and, when the police awakened him, appeared confused.
Procedural Posture:
- Police officers arrested Andrew Russell Wood for Operating Under the Influence of Liquor (OUIL).
- Wood was subsequently charged in the circuit court (trial court) with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and OUIL.
- Wood filed a motion to suppress evidence, including marijuana, blood-alcohol, and field-sobriety test results.
- The circuit judge granted Wood's motion to suppress, ruling that the evidence was the product of an unlawful arrest because police had not observed him 'operating' the vehicle while intoxicated.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the circuit judge's order suppressing the evidence.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a person found unconscious in a stationary vehicle with its engine running, transmission in drive, and only their foot on the brake, constitute 'operating a motor vehicle' within the meaning of the OUIL statute, thereby justifying a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence?
Opinions:
Majority - Levin, J.
Yes, Andrew Russell Wood was 'operating a vehicle' within the meaning of the OUIL statute in the presence of the arresting officers. A police officer may make an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant when the crime is committed in the officer’s presence. The legality of Wood's arrest thus depends on whether he was 'operating a vehicle' when found. The Court defines 'operating' in terms of the danger the OUIL statute seeks to prevent: the collision of a vehicle being operated by an intoxicated person with other persons or property. Once a person has put a vehicle in motion or in a position posing a significant risk of collision, they continue to operate it until it is returned to a position posing no such risk. The Court overruled prior precedent, specifically the Pomeroy/Fulcher holding that 'a person sleeping in a motionless car cannot be held to be presently operating a vehicle while sleeping,' finding it an overgeneralization that overlooked the potential for danger. In Wood's case, the vehicle was in motion (engine running, in drive), and only his foot on the brake prevented it from moving forward. Were he to slip, his foot might move off the brake, putting the vehicle in motion and creating a significant risk of collision. Therefore, Wood continued to operate the vehicle when observed by the officers.
Concurring - Boyle, J.
Yes, Andrew Russell Wood was 'operating' his vehicle in the presence of the officer, and even if he were not, he would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence. Justice Boyle joined the majority, understanding the decision marks the complete demise of People v. Fulcher. She stated that the OUIL statute's purpose is not solely to prevent imminent collisions, but also serves as a prophylactic measure to prevent impaired persons from being at the wheel, regardless of immediate risk. An unconscious person behind the wheel is 'operating' if they would be considered to be 'operating' while awake. Furthermore, Justice Boyle argued that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation (arrest for a misdemeanor not technically committed in the officer's presence) where probable cause exists. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to constitutional violations, not nonconstitutional ones. She cited People v. Burdo and the legislative history of MCL 764.15 (misdemeanor arrest statute), which aimed to expand police authority, not to require suppression. She concluded that suppression is too extreme a remedy and serves no deterrent purpose when official action is pursued in good faith, especially when an officer could reasonably believe a misdemeanor was being committed.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the definition of 'operating a motor vehicle' under Michigan's OUIL statute, clarifying that an intoxicated individual can still be considered 'operating' even if unconscious and stationary, provided the vehicle is in a position of potential danger. By partially overruling Pomeroy/Fulcher, the Court signals a stronger stance on drunk driving enforcement, focusing on the potential for harm rather than just active movement. This precedent provides law enforcement with broader authority for warrantless arrests in similar scenarios, potentially reducing suppression challenges for OUIL charges. The concurring opinion further highlights a critical debate regarding the application of the exclusionary rule, suggesting its limitations to constitutional violations and questioning its appropriateness for statutory arrest procedure errors where probable cause is present, which has broader implications for criminal procedure and evidentiary admissibility.
