People v. Williams
29 P.3d 197, 26 Cal. 4th 779, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
Assault under California Penal Code section 240 is a general intent crime requiring an intentional act and actual knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that the act, by its nature, will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another, but does not require a specific intent to cause injury or a subjective awareness of the risk of injury.
Facts:
- In 1989, Gregory King and Deborah Nicholson married for about two weeks, but continued to have sexual relations.
- In 1992, Nicholson became romantically involved with Lebarron Keith Williams.
- In November 1994, Nicholson gave birth to a son, unsure whether King or Williams was the father.
- King repeatedly telephoned Nicholson, attempting to persuade her to go on an outing with him and his two teenage sons.
- After Nicholson disconnected her phone, King drove to her home with his sons and parked his compact pickup truck at the front curb, while Williams's truck was in the driveway.
- King placed a note on Nicholson’s front door, knocked, and returned to his truck, hoping she would come out to talk.
- Williams opened the door, told King to stay away from Nicholson, retrieved a shotgun from his truck, loaded it with two 12-gauge rounds, and fired a “warning shot” directly into the rear passenger-side wheel well of King’s truck.
- Williams testified that he saw King crouched approximately 1.5 feet from the rear fender well of the truck when he fired, and only noticed King's sons on a curb nearby afterwards, though King testified his sons were getting into the truck at the time of the shot.
- The shotgun pellets hit the rear tire, wheel well, undercarriage, and gas tank of King’s truck, but did not hit King or his sons.
Procedural Posture:
- Lebarron Keith Williams was charged in trial court with one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and three counts of assault with a firearm (one count each for Gregory King and his two sons).
- The trial court provided the standard jury instruction on assault (former CALJIC No. 9.00).
- The jury convicted Williams of assaulting King with a firearm but deadlocked on the remaining counts.
- The trial court subsequently dismissed the deadlocked counts in the interests of justice.
- Williams appealed his assault conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal found the assault instruction erroneous because it incorrectly stated the required mental state and reversed Williams's assault conviction.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to clarify the mental state for assault.
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Issue:
Does assault under California Penal Code section 240 require actual knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that the defendant’s act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another, or does it require a specific intent to injure or a subjective awareness of the risk that an injury might occur?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown, J.
Yes, assault under California Penal Code section 240 requires actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the defendant’s act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another. The court affirmed its prior holdings in People v. Rocha (1971) and People v. Colantuono (1994) that assault is a general intent crime, not requiring a specific intent to cause injury. The court clarified that the term “attempt” in the 1872 assault statute (§ 240) does not require the specific intent found in the general criminal attempt statute (§ 21a), but rather focuses on the objective nature of the act. While prior language about “natural and probable consequences” might have implied a negligence standard, the court clarified that the defendant must have actual knowledge of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe a battery would directly, naturally, and probably result from the conduct. However, the defendant does not need to be subjectively aware of the risk of a battery. The court noted that this clarification does not disturb the principle that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault, nor that mere recklessness or criminal negligence is insufficient. The court found any technical error in the jury instructions given to Williams to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Williams admitted to knowing King's proximity to the truck when he fired the shotgun, demonstrating his actual knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that his act would probably and directly result in a battery.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
No, assault under California Penal Code section 240 requires proof of an intent to injure another, making it a specific intent crime, which the majority's standard does not adequately capture. Justice Kennard reiterated her disagreement with Colantuono, arguing that the plain meaning of § 240, defining assault as an “unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury,” combined with the 1872 code commissioners’ note stating that “If there is no present purpose to do an injury, there is no assault,” mandates an intent to injure. The dissent criticized the majority for selectively interpreting Bouvier’s Law Dictionary and for failing to apply the rule of statutory construction that identical words in the same act should have the same meaning (referring to “attempt” in general criminal attempt statutes). Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority’s standard, which does not require a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm, is not more culpable than criminal negligence or recklessness, thereby failing to be faithful to Colantuono's rejection of mere recklessness. Finally, the dissent found the instructional error prejudicial, as Williams testified he aimed at the truck's wheel well, not King, and plausibly lacked intent to injure or awareness of King's danger, making it uncertain the jury would have convicted under a correct instruction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the complex mental state for assault in California, providing an important distinction between general intent and specific intent. By requiring 'actual knowledge of facts' rather than 'subjective awareness of risk,' the court aims to ensure convictions are based on a defendant's direct understanding of the situation, without requiring proof of a desire to harm or a conscious recognition of danger. This ruling helps guide future jury instructions and provides a clearer framework for prosecutors and defense attorneys, particularly in cases where the defendant claims they did not intend injury but acted in a way that objectively posed a risk. The reaffirmation of assault as a general intent crime also impacts the availability of defenses like voluntary intoxication.
