People v. Wilkins
153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 295 P.3d 903, 56 Cal. 4th 333 (2013)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For the purpose of the felony-murder rule, the underlying felony continues until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety. A killing that occurs after the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety is not considered part of a 'continuous transaction' with the felony.
Facts:
- In 2005, Cole Allen Wilkins and a former girlfriend, Kathleen Trivich, acquired property in Palm Springs to build a house.
- On the evening of July 6, 2006, Dennis Kane's house under construction in Menifee contained numerous new appliances, including a stove.
- Sometime between the evening of July 6 and the early morning of July 7, Wilkins burglarized the Kane home, loading the stolen appliances into Trivich's pickup truck without securing them.
- Shortly before 5:00 a.m. on July 7, while Wilkins was driving on a freeway in Anaheim, approximately 62 miles from the burglarized home, an unsecured stove fell from the truck.
- Another driver, Danny Lay, swerved to avoid the stove and tried to get Wilkins to pull over.
- Shortly thereafter, David Piquette swerved his car to avoid the stove in the freeway lane, collided with a large truck, and was killed.
- Wilkins did not stop to address the hazard and continued driving to his home in Long Beach.
Procedural Posture:
- Cole Allen Wilkins was charged with first degree murder in a California superior court (trial court).
- At trial, the defense requested a jury instruction on the 'escape rule' (CALCRIM No. 3261), but the trial court refused.
- The jury convicted Wilkins of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory.
- Wilkins (appellant) appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding no instructional error.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a felony-murder prosecution where the death occurs during the defendant's flight from the underlying felony, does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the 'escape rule,' which provides that the felony ends once the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety?
Opinions:
Majority - Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.
Yes. A trial court commits reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the escape rule in a felony-murder case where the evidence supports it. The escape rule, which dictates that a felony continues until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety, establishes the outer temporal limit of the 'continuous transaction' required for felony-murder liability. The court clarified that previous case law distinguishing the escape rule from the continuous transaction doctrine applied to accomplice liability, not to cases involving a single perpetrator. Here, substantial evidence existed for a jury to find that Wilkins had reached a place of temporary safety—he was 62 miles from the crime scene, driving for about an hour at normal speeds, and was not being pursued. The trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was a misinstruction on an element of the offense, as it left the jury without the governing legal standard to determine when the underlying burglary had concluded. This error was prejudicial and requires reversal of the conviction.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'escape rule' as a mandatory component of the felony-murder analysis when a death occurs during flight. It clarifies that reaching a place of temporary safety is not merely a factor to consider but is the legal endpoint of the 'continuous transaction.' By doing so, the court prevents an indefinite expansion of felony-murder liability and provides a clearer, more defined temporal boundary for the underlying felony. This precedent requires trial courts to instruct on the escape rule whenever the evidence could support a finding that the defendant had reached safety, giving defendants a critical legal basis to argue that the felony had terminated before the fatal act occurred.
