People v. Watson
637 P.2d 279, 30 Cal. 3d 290 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant who kills another person while driving under the influence of alcohol may be charged with second-degree murder. The vehicular manslaughter statute does not preclude a murder charge if the facts demonstrate that the defendant acted with implied malice, which requires a subjective awareness of the high degree of risk to human life and a conscious disregard of that risk.
Facts:
- On the night of January 2, 1979, Robert Watson consumed large quantities of beer at a bar.
- Approximately an hour and a half after leaving the bar, Watson drove through a red light and narrowly avoided a collision with another car by skidding to a stop in the middle of the intersection.
- Following this near collision, Watson drove away at a high speed.
- Watson approached another intersection where he struck a Toyota sedan, killing the driver and her six-year-old daughter.
- Expert testimony estimated Watson's speed immediately prior to braking was 84 miles per hour in a 35 mph zone, and his speed at impact was approximately 70 miles per hour.
- A half-hour after the collision, Watson's blood alcohol content was measured at .23 percent, more than double the legal limit.
Procedural Posture:
- The People charged Robert Watson in the initial complaint with two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of vehicular manslaughter.
- At the preliminary examination, the magistrate found probable cause for the manslaughter charges but dismissed the two murder counts, finding insufficient evidence of implied malice.
- Despite the magistrate's ruling, the People included the two murder counts in the information filed in the superior court.
- Watson, as the defendant, filed a motion in the superior court to dismiss the murder counts.
- The superior court granted Watson's motion to dismiss.
- The People, as appellant, appealed the superior court's order of dismissal.
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Issue:
Does the vehicular manslaughter statute (Penal Code § 192, subd. 3(a)) preclude a charge of second-degree murder when a homicide results from a defendant driving a vehicle while intoxicated?
Opinions:
Majority - Richardson, J.
No, the vehicular manslaughter statute does not preclude a charge of second-degree murder. Second-degree murder may be charged if the facts surrounding the offense support a finding of implied malice, which is distinct from the gross negligence required for vehicular manslaughter. Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence and involves an element of wantonness absent in the lesser offense. While gross negligence is evaluated using an objective 'reasonable person' standard, implied malice requires a subjective determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved. Here, Watson's conduct—consuming alcohol to the point of intoxication knowing he would have to drive, his excessive speed, and the prior near-miss—could reasonably support a conclusion that he acted with a conscious disregard for human life, justifying the murder charge.
Dissenting - Bird, C. J.
Yes, the vehicular manslaughter statute should preclude a murder charge on these facts. The majority rewrites the law of implied malice and ignores disputed facts favorable to the defendant, such as eyewitness testimony that the defendant had a green light. The court impermissibly substitutes its judgment for the magistrate's on factual matters. The majority's reasoning—inferring a conscious disregard for life from the act of driving to a bar and drinking—will make it a virtual certainty that any drunk driver involved in a fatal accident will be charged with murder. This expands the concept of implied malice beyond what the legislature intended when it created the specific crime of vehicular manslaughter.
Dissenting - Ibáñez, J.
Yes, the specific vehicular manslaughter statute preempts the general murder statute in this context. The definitional boundary line between gross negligence and implied malice is illusory and inadequate as a legal guideline. A review of the legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature intended for vehicular homicides to be prosecuted under the specific statute it created for that purpose. By allowing tandem charges, the majority creates an amorphous standard that will lead to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, which is a policy decision that should be left to the Legislature.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established that a defendant causing a fatal traffic accident while driving under the influence can be prosecuted for second-degree murder, not just vehicular manslaughter. It created what is now commonly referred to in California as a 'Watson murder.' The case hinges on the distinction between the objective standard of gross negligence for manslaughter and the subjective standard of implied malice for murder, requiring proof that the defendant personally and consciously disregarded the life-threatening risk. This ruling significantly increased the potential criminal liability for intoxicated drivers and has shaped prosecutorial strategy in fatal DUI cases for decades.
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