People v. Washington
869 N.E.2d 641, 8 N.Y.3d 565, 838 N.Y.S.2d 465 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A conditional agreement to commit a crime in the future can be subject to prosecution under conspiracy law, even if the performance of the agreed-upon criminal act is contingent on a future event, provided the conditions are considered terms of the agreement and not demands preventing its formation.
Facts:
- While incarcerated at Rikers Island on child endangerment and promotion of prostitution charges, Moye confided in fellow inmate Martin Mitchell, a government informant, that he would pay $5,000 to have the 14-year-old complaining witness in his child endangerment case killed.
- After Mitchell was released from incarceration, Moye provided him with a telephone number to contact Moye's associates to arrange the contract killing.
- On August 23, 2002, Moye changed the intended victim from the complaining witness to a rival named 'Seven,' who had allegedly shot Moye, and stated he would now pay $4,000 for Seven's killing.
- A week later, Mitchell and an undercover officer, posing as a hit man, visited Moye at Rikers Island, where Moye instructed the undercover to telephone coconspirator Crystal Rhodes to obtain information on contacting another associate, Kenny, to discuss the plan for killing Seven, providing Rhodes's telephone number.
- After the undercover discovered Kenny was incarcerated, Moye agreed to have the undercover visit him again.
- On September 13, 2002, Moye instructed the undercover to 'just hold the girl' (the complaining witness) and to 'wait [until he] g[o]t out…because [he wanted to] put [his] hands on some major money' for Seven's killing, describing Seven and his general location.
- Moye stated he would 'try to keep a tab on [Seven]' and that a woman he knew, Rabia Walker, 'runs into him every now and then' and 'she could show [the undercover] the building' where Seven lived.
- On September 22, 2002, the undercover called Walker, who acknowledged that she knew of the plan to kill Seven and was to identify him from pictures.
- The next day, Walker informed the undercover that 'there’ll be no payments made or anything because [defendant] doesn’t want anything done until he comes home.'
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Moye was incarcerated at Rikers Island on child endangerment and promotion of prostitution charges.
- Moye was arrested and charged with conspiracy in the second degree.
- After a nonjury trial, Supreme Court (trial court) decided that Moye and Mitchell entered into an agreement to eliminate Seven and found sufficient overt acts to constitute conspiracy in the second degree.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the agreement to kill the intended victim remained firm despite postponement and that evidence established numerous overt acts in furtherance.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does an agreement to commit a murder in the future, where the performance of the act is conditioned upon the defendant's release from jail and acquisition of funds, constitute a legally cognizable conspiracy under New York law?
Opinions:
Majority - Ciparick, J.
Yes, an agreement to commit a murder in the future, even with conditions regarding its performance, constitutes a legally cognizable conspiracy under New York law when those conditions are viewed as terms of the agreement rather than impediments to its formation. The court concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Moye's conviction for conspiracy in the second degree. New York law defines conspiracy as an agreement to commit an underlying substantive crime, coupled with an overt act in furtherance thereof. The court rejected Moye's argument that the conditions he imposed—his release from prison and ability to secure money for the hit—negated the agreement. Instead, the court viewed these requirements as 'terms of the agreement,' which merely specified the temporal component of the agreement's performance, rather than demands that prevented its formation. The court distinguished Moye’s case from situations where a party’s conditions are 'unacceptable' to other parties, thereby preventing any agreement. The court also noted that even under federal circuit tests, which require a defendant to subjectively believe a condition is likely to be fulfilled or consider conditions legally irrelevant unless illusory, Moye's conviction would be upheld because he reasonably believed his release from prison would occur. Furthermore, the court found sufficient evidence that the parties had agreed upon the $4,000 price for the hit and that numerous overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, including Moye providing contact information and coordinating with associates to locate and identify the intended victim.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of conspiracy law in New York, particularly concerning agreements made conditional on future events. It establishes that conditions related to the performance of an agreed-upon criminal act do not necessarily negate the existence of a conspiracy, as long as these conditions are accepted by all parties as terms of the agreement rather than unresolved demands. This ruling broadens the scope of prosecutable conspiracies, making it more difficult for defendants to argue that a plot was merely speculative or an incomplete negotiation due to contingencies. It reinforces the principle that a 'concrete and unambiguous' intent to violate the law, coupled with overt acts, is sufficient for conviction, thereby enhancing the state's ability to interdict criminal enterprises at an earlier stage.
