People v. Vilardi
556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Under the New York State Constitution, when a defendant makes a specific request for exculpatory material, the prosecution's failure to disclose it constitutes reversible error if there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the non-disclosure contributed to the verdict. New York expressly rejects the less protective federal 'reasonable probability' standard from United States v. Bagley in such cases.
Facts:
- Defendant Vilardi conspired with Ronnie and William Bernacet and others to plant two pipe bombs in Brooklyn, one under a pizzeria and one under a laundromat.
- The People alleged the laundromat bomb exploded, which was a necessary element for the charge of arson in the first degree.
- Officer Daniel Kiely, a Bomb Squad expert, inspected the laundromat basement the day after the incident.
- Officer Kiely wrote an initial report stating that a 'thorough inspection of the basement revealed no evidence that there had been an explosion.'
- Before his trial, Vilardi's counsel made a specific discovery request for all reports 'by ballistics, firearm and explosive experts.'
- In response, the prosecutor sent Vilardi's counsel 12 reports but knowingly or negligently failed to include Officer Kiely's initial exculpatory report.
Procedural Posture:
- The Bernacet brothers, co-conspirators, were tried first and acquitted of first-degree arson after using Officer Kiely's exculpatory report in their defense.
- Vilardi was tried and convicted in the trial court on all counts, including first-degree arson, without the benefit of the exculpatory report.
- Vilardi's appellate counsel discovered the undisclosed report and filed a motion to vacate the conviction in the trial court.
- The trial court denied the motion to vacate.
- Vilardi (as appellant) appealed to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division modified the trial court's order, vacating the first-degree arson conviction and ordering a new trial on that charge.
- The People (as appellant) were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York.
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Issue:
Under the New York State Constitution, does the prosecution's failure to disclose specifically requested exculpatory evidence require reversal if there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the evidence contributed to the verdict?
Opinions:
Majority - Kaye, J.
Yes. A showing of a 'reasonable possibility' that the failure to disclose the exculpatory report contributed to the verdict is the appropriate standard to measure materiality under the New York State Constitution where the prosecutor was made aware by a specific discovery request that the defendant considered the material important. This court declines to adopt the federal standard from United States v. Bagley, which held that undisclosed evidence is material only if there is a 'reasonable probability' that it would have altered the trial's outcome. New York's standard is predicated on 'elemental fairness' and ensuring prosecutors discharge their ethical obligations. The suppression of evidence specifically requested by the defense is more serious and undermines the fairness of the trial. The 'reasonable possibility' standard properly encourages prosecutorial compliance and protects the jury's role, which is impaired when it is denied important evidence.
Concurrence - Simons, J.
No. The court should adopt the federal 'reasonable probability' standard from United States v. Bagley for all prosecutorial disclosure failures, as exculpatory evidence is either material or not, and its materiality does not change based on the form of the defendant's request. However, I concur in affirming the judgment because the evidence withheld in this case was manifestly exculpatory and material even under the stricter federal standard. Applying a different rule than the federal standard based on a preference for another rule creates instability and uncertainty in the law when the state and federal due process clauses are textually similar and there is no independent body of state law compelling a different result.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that New York's Due Process Clause provides greater protection to defendants than the U.S. Constitution regarding Brady violations. The court intentionally diverged from the Supreme Court's unified 'reasonable probability' standard in Bagley, preserving a two-tiered framework where the state's response to a specific request is judged more strictly. This holding places a higher burden on New York prosecutors to conduct thorough searches and err on the side of disclosure when faced with specific discovery demands. It reinforces New York's tradition of using its state constitution to provide broader rights than the federal floor, particularly in matters of trial fairness and prosecutorial conduct.
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