People v. VanderVliet
508 N.W.2d 114, 444 Mich. 52 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Under Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if it is offered for a proper non-character purpose, is relevant, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and a limiting instruction can be given upon request. The rule is inclusionary, and a defendant's general plea of not guilty puts all elements of the charged offense, including intent, at issue.
Facts:
- Daniel VanderVliet worked as a case manager for developmentally disabled young men.
- In October 1988, one of VanderVliet's clients, Steven C, alleged that VanderVliet sexually assaulted him by masturbation at VanderVliet's brother's house after asking him to shower.
- Following Steven C's complaint, VanderVliet's supervisor, Fred Ward, instructed him that any future client contact must occur in public settings or, if at a residence, be closely documented.
- In May 1989, VanderVliet became the case manager for another client, Todd F.
- Between May and August 1989, Todd F alleged that VanderVliet took him to the same brother's house, watched him shower, and touched his testicles on several occasions.
- VanderVliet admitted to police that he took both clients to the house but denied any sexual contact, claiming the shower for Steven C was for hygiene reasons and that any physical contact with Todd F was accidental.
- A police investigation uncovered a third, uncharged allegation from another client, John J, who claimed VanderVliet also masturbated him after asking him to take a shower.
Procedural Posture:
- The prosecutor charged Daniel VanderVliet in Kent County Circuit Court (the trial court) in two separate cases of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
- Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to admit evidence of VanderVliet's conduct toward all three alleged victims (Todd F, Steven C, and John J) in each of the pending trials under MRE 404(b).
- The trial court denied the prosecutor's motion, ruling the evidence of other misconduct inadmissible.
- The prosecutor (appellant) filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding the evidence was not probative of a matter 'in issue' and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
- The prosecutor then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does MRE 404(b) prohibit the admission of evidence of a defendant's other alleged acts of sexual misconduct in a criminal sexual conduct trial, where the evidence is offered to show intent or a common scheme and to rebut a potential claim of accident, even when the defendant enters a general denial?
Opinions:
Majority - Boyle, J.
No. MRE 404(b) does not prohibit the admission of such evidence, as the rule is inclusionary rather than exclusionary. Evidence of other acts is admissible whenever it is relevant on a non-character theory, such as proving intent or absence of mistake. The court formally adopts a four-part standard for admissibility: 1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; 2) it must be relevant; 3) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (MRE 403); and 4) a limiting instruction may be given upon request. A defendant's plea of not guilty puts all elements of the crime in issue, including intent, so the prosecution may introduce other acts evidence to prove that element, even if the defendant has not yet explicitly raised a defense like accident. Here, the other acts are relevant to negate the possibility that VanderVliet's contact with the victims was accidental or lacked sexual purpose.
Separate opinion - Levin, J.
No. While concurring with the majority's conclusion and its adoption of the Huddleston framework, this opinion stresses that other acts evidence must be probative of a genuinely disputed material issue. Justice Levin cautions against a rule that allows a simple 'not guilty' plea to automatically open the door to highly prejudicial other acts evidence. He argues that unless the defendant actually claims at trial that the touching was accidental or not for sexual gratification, the evidence should not be admitted, as it would then be used improperly to prove the commission of the act itself (actus reus) through a forbidden character inference, rather than proving a disputed mental state.
Dissenting - Cavanagh, C.J.
Yes. The existing Michigan framework for analyzing other acts evidence, particularly the test from People v. Golochowicz, is sufficient and should not be replaced. The majority's 'new' standard is not truly new but merely a restatement of the principles already embedded in Michigan's evidentiary rules (MRE 401, 403, 404, 104b). Discarding established precedent will only create more confusion. The dissent argues that courts should err on the side of excluding such evidence in close cases to prevent the grave danger of a conviction based on a defendant's past misconduct rather than on the evidence of their conduct in the case at hand.
Analysis:
This decision significantly shifted Michigan's jurisprudence on 'other acts' evidence by explicitly adopting the inclusionary approach of the federal rules and the four-part test from Huddleston v. United States. It overrules the perception that the more restrictive test from People v. Golochowicz was the universal standard, clarifying that Golochowicz applies primarily to modus operandi evidence used to prove identity. By holding that a general 'not guilty' plea places intent at issue, the court lowered the barrier for prosecutors to introduce MRE 404(b) evidence in their case-in-chief, making it harder for defendants to keep prior alleged misconduct from the jury simply by not raising a specific defense before trial.
