Yes. The judge should have let the jury consider Unger's reason for escaping. The law has a defense called 'necessity,' which is like choosing the 'lesser of two evils.' Unger's story was that he had to choose between escaping (a crime) and possibly being killed (a much worse evil). Because he presented evidence of this, the jury should have been allowed to decide if they believed him. The court said you don't have to follow a strict checklist (like turning yourself in immediately) to use this defense; those actions just help the jury decide if you're telling the truth.

No. The judge was right not to let the jury consider the excuse. Letting prisoners easily use this defense could cause chaos and more escapes. To prevent that, there should be very strict rules. For example, a prisoner should only get to use the 'necessity' defense if they had no other choice, didn't hurt anyone, AND turned themselves in as soon as they were safe. Unger didn't follow those rules, so he shouldn't get to use the excuse.

Yes, the court was wrong. Unger's story could allow him to use the 'necessity' defense, meaning he had to choose between two bad options - stay and possibly be badly hurt or killed, or escape. The jury should have been allowed to think about his reasons for escaping. The judge made a mistake by not letting the jury consider this defense.

Letting prisoners use the necessity defense any time they escape is a bad idea and could cause problems in the future. It should only be allowed in very specific situations, like the ones talked about in another case called Lovercamp. Unger didn't meet those conditions because he didn't tell the prison guards about his problem, didn't turn himself in right after escaping, and committed more crimes after escaping. So the judge didn't make a mistake with the instructions given to the jury.

Yes. A defendant charged with escape is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity if they have presented "some evidence" to support that defense. The court determined that necessity, which involves choosing the lesser of two evils, is a more appropriate defense in this context than compulsion, which involves being coerced to perform a specific act by an imminent threat. Unger's testimony about threats, a sexual assault, and a death threat constituted sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction. The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant must satisfy the rigid, five-condition test from *People v. Lovercamp*. Instead, the court held that those conditions—such as immediately reporting to authorities upon reaching safety—are not mandatory preconditions but are factors for the jury to consider when assessing the weight and credibility of the defendant's necessity claim.

No. While a necessity defense should be recognized in prison escape cases, its availability should be narrowly circumscribed by the well-defined conditions established in *People v. Lovercamp* to prevent disruption of prison discipline and danger to the public. The dissent argues that public policy requires strict limitations on this defense. It is undisputed that Unger failed to meet these conditions; he did not complain to authorities about the most recent threats and did not immediately report to them after escaping. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the necessity defense.

Yes, it was error. The defendant's testimony was sufficient to raise the affirmative defense of necessity. The jury should have been allowed to consider the defense based on his testimony, because if believed, it showed he was forced to choose between two admitted evils - staying and facing serious injury or death, or escaping. The trial court erred in instructing the jury to disregard the reasons for the escape and in refusing to give an instruction on the defense of necessity.

The majority's unconditional recognition of the necessity defense for prison escapes is troubling and could lead to future problems. The defense should only be available when well-defined conditions are met, such as those outlined in People v. Lovercamp, to prevent abuse. Here, the defendant did not meet those conditions because he did not complain to authorities, did not immediately report to authorities upon reaching safety, and engaged in additional criminal conduct after his escape. Therefore, the trial court did not err in its instructions.

People v. Unger

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