People v. Tran
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 96 Daily Journal DAR 8225, 47 Cal. App. 4th 253 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The 'serves no legitimate purpose' element of California's stalking statute (Penal Code § 646.9) is not unconstitutionally vague when read in context, and assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime where intent to injure any reasonably foreseeable person is sufficient, regardless of specific intent toward a particular victim. The revised CALJIC No. 2.90 instruction on reasonable doubt, omitting 'to a moral certainty,' is constitutional.
Facts:
- Around 2 a.m. on December 17, 1994, Police Officer Alan Pham was summoned to the First Club in downtown San Jose to act as a Vietnamese interpreter in the investigation of a disturbance in the parking lot.
- Witness Nga Nguyen observed Chu Tran and Hien Thi yelling at each other in the parking lot, and Chu Tran grabbed a hammer that had been sitting on the hood of Hien Thi’s car, but Nguyen took it out of his hand.
- Hien Thi told Officer Pham that Chu Tran had stalked her in the past, threatened to kill her and her husband, Sang Ngoc Tang, because he wanted to be romantically involved with her, and she felt afraid and in danger.
- Officer Pham confiscated the hammer, searched Chu Tran for identification when he refused to provide any, and warned him not to go back into the club.
- Sometime before the December 17 incident, Chu Tran had threatened Hien Thi several times at the club with a knife, throwing it on the table, and had also smashed the windows of her car on an earlier occasion.
- On December 21, Hien Thi and Sang Ngoc Tang arrived home around 11:30 p.m., parked their car, and walked to their apartment, with Sang Ngoc Tang carrying their sleeping 18-month-old son, Jackson Tang.
- Chu Tran suddenly appeared, looked to Hien Thi, said 'I apologize,' and then began chasing Sang Ngoc Tang and the baby while wielding a long, 18-inch knife with both hands.
- Sang Ngoc Tang fled, running around the swimming pool and across the street, yelling for help, and feared Chu Tran would kill the child if he put him down, until neighbors intervened and called the police.
Procedural Posture:
- Chu Tran was charged and convicted by a jury in the trial court (California Superior Court) of one count of felony stalking and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon.
- The jury also found true personal use allegations regarding the weapons.
- Chu Tran admitted a prior prison conviction.
- Chu Tran was sentenced to a total of six years in prison.
- Chu Tran, as the appellant, challenged the constitutionality of the stalking statute, the sufficiency of the evidence of assault with a deadly weapon, and the reasonable doubt instruction on appeal to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
1. Is the 'serves no legitimate purpose' clause within the definition of 'harasses' in California's stalking statute (Penal Code § 646.9) unconstitutionally vague, thus offending the due process clause? 2. Does a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon require proof of a specific intent to injure the particular victim, or is general intent to commit a violent act, which foreseeably endangers that victim, sufficient? 3. Does the revised CALJIC No. 2.90 jury instruction on reasonable doubt, which omits the phrase 'to a moral certainty,' unconstitutionally lower the prosecution's burden of proof?
Opinions:
Majority - Wunderlich, J.
Yes, the 'serves no legitimate purpose' clause in Penal Code section 646.9 is not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that a statute's language should be given a reasonable and practical construction, and its sufficiency must be examined in light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. The statute defines 'harasses' as knowing, willful conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes them, and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Chu Tran's acts, such as threatening Hien Thi with a knife or hammer and chasing her husband and baby while wielding a long knife, are clearly prohibited, and his ulterior desire to pursue a romantic relationship does not make these actions 'legitimate.' The statute provides fair notice of prohibited conduct and a standard for enforcement, satisfying due process requirements. No, a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of a specific intent to injure a particular victim; general intent to commit a violent act, which will injure any reasonably foreseeable person, is sufficient. The court clarified that assault with a deadly weapon is a 'general intent' crime requiring a willful attempt to commit a battery, an act that has the direct, natural, and probable consequence of causing injury. It is not necessary to prove a specific intent to inflict a particular harm or to strike a specific person. Chu Tran's act of chasing Sang Ngoc Tang and the baby while wielding a long knife demonstrates a willful attempt to use physical force against the victims he was pursuing. An injury to Jackson was a foreseeable consequence of attacking Sang Ngoc Tang, who was carrying the baby. No, the revised CALJIC No. 2.90 instruction on reasonable doubt, which omits the phrase 'to a moral certainty,' does not unconstitutionally lower the prosecution's burden of proof. The court noted that the revision was made in response to suggestions from the California and United States Supreme Courts to address concerns regarding the phrase's potentially confusing nature. The use of the phrase 'abiding conviction,' in the context of the complete instruction, adequately encompasses the appropriate depth or intensity of the jury’s certainty and satisfies the requirements of due process.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of California's stalking statute, affirming its constitutionality against vagueness challenges by emphasizing contextual interpretation of its elements. It also reinforces the nature of assault with a deadly weapon as a general intent crime, broadening the scope of culpability to include foreseeable harm to individuals beyond the primary target. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the validity of the revised reasonable doubt instruction, aligning state criminal procedure with federal constitutional standards. These holdings provide important guidance for prosecutors and courts in future cases involving domestic violence, general intent crimes, and jury instructions.
