People v. . Teal
196 N.Y. 372, 24 N.Y. Crim. 83, 89 N.E. 1086 (1909)
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Rule of Law:
An attempt to procure false testimony does not constitute attempted subornation of perjury unless the solicited testimony, if actually given, would be material to the specific legal issues framed by the pleadings at the time of the attempt.
Facts:
- Helen K. Gould filed a lawsuit seeking a divorce from her husband, Frank J. Gould.
- The complaint in the divorce action alleged a single, specific act of adultery committed by Frank J. Gould in North Sydney, Canada, on July 25, 1905.
- Margaret Teal (the defendant) attempted to induce another person, Mabel MacCauslan, to provide false testimony in the Gould divorce case.
- The solicited false testimony was that MacCauslan had seen Frank J. Gould coming out of the bedroom of a woman named Bessie Van Doren in New York City in March 1908.
- This solicited testimony pertained to a separate act of adultery that was not mentioned in the divorce complaint.
- At the time Teal made this attempt, the complaint had been served, but the time for Helen K. Gould to amend it had not yet expired.
Procedural Posture:
- Margaret Teal was indicted for the crime of attempted subornation of perjury.
- At trial in the court of first instance, a jury found Teal guilty.
- Teal appealed the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction.
- Teal, the appellant, then appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does attempting to procure false testimony, which is not material to the issue framed by the pleadings at the time of the attempt, constitute the crime of attempted subornation of perjury?
Opinions:
Majority - Werner, J.
No. An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that crime, tending but failing to effect its commission. The target crime here is subornation of perjury, which requires that actual perjury be committed. A core element of perjury is the materiality of the false testimony to the issue at hand. Since the testimony Teal sought to procure from MacCauslan was about an act of adultery in New York in 1908, it was utterly immaterial to the sole issue pleaded in the divorce action, which was an act of adultery in Canada in 1905. Because the solicited testimony was not material, MacCauslan could not have been guilty of perjury if she had given it. Consequently, Teal could not be guilty of subornation of perjury, and therefore cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime that was legally impossible to complete. The possibility that the complaint might later be amended to make the testimony material is irrelevant; the criminality of an act must be judged based on the circumstances and pleadings as they exist at the time the act is committed.
Dissenting - Haight, J.
Yes. The materiality requirement should not be construed so narrowly as to only apply to issues formally framed in the pleadings. Lord Coke's definition of perjury refers to testimony material to the 'issue, or cause in question.' The 'cause in question' was the divorce action itself, and the solicited testimony, if true, would have established grounds for divorce, making it material to the overall cause. Furthermore, the crime of attempt depends on the mind and intent of the actor, not on the impossibility of completing the act due to an external factor like the current state of the pleadings, which could have been amended. To hold otherwise creates a dangerous loophole allowing parties to solicit false testimony with impunity before pleadings are finalized. The defendant's criminal intent and actions were clear, and that should be sufficient to constitute an attempt.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a strict interpretation of the materiality element for the crime of attempted subornation of perjury, creating a 'legal impossibility' defense. It distinguishes this crime from other attempt crimes (like attempted larceny) where intent is paramount and factual impossibility is not a defense. The ruling emphasizes that for perjury-related offenses, the statutory element of materiality must be met based on the legal issues as they formally exist at the moment of the attempt, not on potential future issues. This forces prosecutors to charge such conduct under more appropriate statutes, like 'falsifying evidence', which may not have a materiality requirement, thereby shaping prosecutorial strategy in obstruction of justice cases.
