People v. Tabarez
113 A.D.2d 461, 1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52944, 497 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) is applicable to a charge of attempted murder. A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense if there is sufficient credible evidence for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that both the subjective and objective elements of the defense are established.
Facts:
- The defendant had been unemployed for approximately nine months and had a history of mental health issues, including borderline intellectual functioning, schizophrenia, and several personality disorders.
- On February 18, 1981, the defendant boarded a train to an unknown location, New Rochelle, and began walking about aimlessly.
- The defendant entered a liquor store, brandished a gun, and demanded money from the owner.
- After taking the money, the defendant lingered in the store for several minutes before walking, not running, away.
- Shortly thereafter, Police Officer Douglas Burrell confronted the defendant, who then fired a shot in the officer's direction.
- After the exchange of fire, the defendant resumed walking away, seemingly oblivious, until other officers arrived and he eventually threw down his weapon.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was tried before a jury in the County Court on charges of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon.
- During the trial, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as it related to the attempted murder charge.
- The County Court judge refused to provide the requested instruction to the jury.
- The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.
- The defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to this court, the Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance for an attempted murder charge when the defendant presents evidence of pre-existing psychological conditions, unemployment stress, and bizarre behavior surrounding the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Gibbons, J.
Yes. The trial court erred by refusing to give the requested instruction. The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance must be available for attempted murder to avoid the absurd result of punishing an unsuccessful attempt more severely than a completed murder that is mitigated to manslaughter. Here, the defendant met the threshold for the instruction by presenting sufficient credible evidence for a jury to consider the defense. The evidence included expert testimony on his mental disorders, his bizarre behavior, and stressors like prolonged unemployment. The two-part test for EED requires a subjective inquiry into whether the defendant actually acted under EED, and an objective inquiry into whether there was a reasonable explanation for it from the defendant's perspective. While the robbery itself cannot be the 'reasonable explanation,' a jury could find that the defendant's pre-existing conditions and life stressors, which were not of his own culpable making, constituted a reasonable explanation for his emotional state. Therefore, the question of cause and reasonableness was a factual matter for the jury to resolve, and withholding the instruction was a reversible error.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Lawrence, J.
No. The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the defense. While the EED defense is theoretically available for attempted murder, it does not apply where the emotional stress arises directly from the defendant's own culpable conduct, such as committing an armed robbery. The defendant’s own psychiatric expert testified that the pressure confronting him was 'knowing that he had done something bad, something wrong' and 'being confronted with a police officer.' The defense is intended for situations where a significant mental trauma, for which the defendant is not culpably responsible, leads to a loss of self-control. Here, the defendant brought about his own mental disturbance by choosing to commit a violent felony, and his actions were a direct result of that crime, making the EED defense inapplicable as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision extends the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance from murder to attempted murder in New York, preventing a paradoxical sentencing structure where failure is punished more harshly than success. It reinforces a low evidentiary threshold for a defendant to be entitled to an EED jury instruction, emphasizing that the roles of judge and jury are distinct; the judge determines if there is sufficient evidence, but the jury weighs that evidence and assesses credibility and reasonableness. The case highlights the critical distinction between an emotional disturbance arising from a non-culpable, underlying condition and one arising from the stress of committing the crime itself, leaving the ultimate determination of that factual cause to the jury.
