People v. Suarez
6 N.Y.3d 202, 844 N.E.2d 721, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
Depraved indifference murder requires proof of a defendant's utter disregard for the value of human life, a culpable mental state distinct from an intent to kill or cause serious injury. A one-on-one killing, such as a shooting or stabbing, can almost never qualify as depraved indifference murder because it involves a manifest intent to harm a specific individual, not a general indifference to human life.
Facts:
- On February 12, 2000, Trisha McPherson went to the home of her ex-boyfriend, Kirk Wright, where they argued over child support.
- During the argument, after Wright allegedly pushed her and raised his hand, McPherson stabbed him once in the chest with a knife.
- McPherson immediately called 911 for an ambulance upon seeing Wright was bleeding, but she left the scene before help arrived.
- Wright subsequently died from the stab wound.
- On February 22, 2000, Santos Suarez argued with his girlfriend, Jovanna Gonzalez, in their apartment.
- During the argument, Suarez stabbed Gonzalez three times—in the throat, chest, and abdomen.
- Suarez then fled the apartment without summoning any medical assistance for Gonzalez.
- Gonzalez eventually bled to death from her wounds.
Procedural Posture:
- In People v. Suarez, the defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder by a jury in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County (trial court), after being acquitted of intentional murder.
- In People v. McPherson, the defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder by a judge in a nonjury trial in the New York Supreme Court, Kings County (trial court).
- Both Suarez and McPherson appealed their convictions to their respective intermediate appellate courts, the Appellate Division, First and Second Departments.
- In both cases, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding the evidence legally sufficient.
- The New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) granted both defendants leave to appeal and consolidated the cases for its review.
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Issue:
Does a one-on-one killing committed by stabbing constitute depraved indifference murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2)?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A one-on-one stabbing does not constitute depraved indifference murder. Depraved indifference murder is a narrow category of homicide applicable only to conduct that is as morally reprehensible as intentional murder but results from an utter disregard for human life rather than an intent to kill. The statutory element of 'circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life' is a distinct requirement beyond mere recklessness and a grave risk of death. Killings directed at a single person, whether intended to kill or merely injure, are fundamentally inconsistent with the 'indifference' required for this crime. The court identified two rare scenarios where a one-on-one killing might qualify: 1) abandoning a helpless victim to die in a highly perilous situation created by the defendant, or 2) engaging in a brutal, prolonged course of torture. Neither Suarez's act of stabbing his victim three times and fleeing, nor McPherson's act of stabbing her victim once and calling for help, fits within this small category of cases.
Concurring - G.B. Smith, Rosenblatt and R.S. Smith, JJ.
Yes, we concur fully with the majority's conclusion but write to state that the court should explicitly overrule its prior decisions in People v. Register and People v. Sanchez, which had created an overly expansive definition of depraved indifference murder. This correction is a necessary, albeit unpleasant, duty to ensure future homicide prosecutions are more sustainable and that defendants are convicted of the crimes they actually committed. This new, more restrictive interpretation should be applied prospectively to avoid disrupting finalized convictions.
Concurring - Read, J.
Yes, I concur in the result based on the constraint of recent precedent in cases like People v. Payne. However, I find the majority's rationale for deviating from longstanding precedent unconvincing and believe the dissenting opinion's reasoning is more sound. The court's evolving jurisprudence in this area creates a significant policy issue that must now be resolved by the Legislature.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Graffeo, J.
No as to Suarez, Yes as to McPherson. The majority's holding is inconsistent with the statutory language and precedent, which establish that the key distinction between depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter is the objective degree of risk—a 'grave' risk for murder versus a 'substantial' risk for manslaughter. This determination should be left to the jury. In Suarez's case, a rational jury could have found he acted recklessly by stabbing the victim three times, creating a grave risk of death that evinced a depraved indifference to her life. In McPherson's case, however, her act of calling 911 demonstrated she was not indifferent, so her conviction should be reversed. The majority's decision improperly usurps the jury's role and creates artificial categories of murder not found in the statute.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly narrows the application of the depraved indifference murder statute in New York. It effectively curtails the common prosecutorial practice of charging both intentional and depraved indifference murder as alternative counts, forcing a clearer distinction based on the defendant's mental state. The ruling re-establishes that depraved indifference is a unique mens rea of utter inhumanity and disregard for life, not merely a heightened form of recklessness. This precedent requires trial courts to dismiss depraved indifference charges in nearly all one-on-one killings, thereby preventing juries from reaching compromise verdicts on a charge that does not fit the evidence of a direct, intentional attack.
