Yes, his actions counted as an attempted burglary. The court explained that just getting ready for a crime (like buying tools) isn't a crime itself. But once you take a direct step to actually do it, it becomes an 'attempt.' The man's drilling was more than just planning; it was the first step of the break-in. Once he crossed that line from 'getting ready' to 'doing,' he had already committed the crime of attempted burglary. It didn't matter that he stopped or changed his mind later; the crime was already complete.

Yes, what Staples did was an attempt to burglarize the bank, even though he gave up on his own before anyone interrupted him. Staples intended to burglarize the bank, which he admitted. Drilling the holes was a clear step towards committing the burglary that went past just preparing. It was the start of the "breaking in" part. The law doesn't say the very last step before finishing the crime has to happen for it to be an attempt. Once the person's actions have gone far enough towards the crime to be an attempt, stopping on their own is not a defense. The law wants to protect people from those planning to commit crimes. When someone clearly intends to commit a crime and what they do creates a danger of harm, it doesn't matter if they don't finish the crime for some other reason. There wasn't direct proof Staples was stopped, but the judge reasonably decided Staples figured out his landlord found the equipment and told the police, which was basically like being stopped.

Once a defendant's actions have "reached such a stage of advancement that they can be classified as an attempt... there can be no exculpatory abandonment

—it was held that the overt act sufficient to bring about an attempt need not be the last proximate or ultimate step towards commission of the substantive crime.

"Applying criminal culpability to acts directly moving toward commission of crime... is an obvious safeguard to society because it makes it unnecessary for police to wait before intervening until the actor has done the substantive evil sought to be prevented. It allows such criminal conduct to be stopped or intercepted when it becomes clear what the actor's intention is and …

It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement toward the commission of the offense after the preparations are made

—committed an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the intended crime.

Unfortunately for Mr. Staples, however, the trier of fact did not believe him and found his abandonment involuntary, the product of outside circumstances.

An attempt to commit a crime may occur when the defendant's criminal goal is frustrated by extraneous circumstances

Although the cases cited by Bogarin are, as he argues, factually apposite to this case, those cases nevertheless do not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion

Accordingly, "for the prosecution to prove that defendant committed an attempt to burglarize as proscribed by Penal Code section 664, it was required to establish that he had the specific intent to commit a burglary of the [house] and that his acts toward that goal went beyond mere preparation

Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960), exculpating an actor who completely and voluntarily renounces an unconsummated criminal plan, even though he had already done enough so that were he interrupted by external forces, he would be guilty of attempt.

Yes, the defendant's acts constitute a criminal attempt. The court affirmed that for an attempt to occur, a defendant must have the specific intent to commit a crime and their acts must go beyond mere preparation. The court distinguished between two categories of attempts: 1) those where the actor does all necessary acts but fails due to an external factor, and 2) those where the actor's conduct is a direct movement toward the crime but is intercepted or stopped before the final step. The defendant's conduct falls into the second category. The act of drilling into the floor was an unequivocal and direct step toward completing the burglary; it was the beginning of the 'breaking' element of the crime. Once the defendant's actions crossed the line from preparation to a completed attempt, any subsequent abandonment of the plan, whether voluntary or prompted by a fear of detection, could not absolve him of liability for the attempt.

Yes, Staples' actions went beyond mere preparation and constituted an attempt to commit burglary, even though he voluntarily abandoned his plan before being interrupted by external circumstances. Staples had the specific intent to commit burglary, as evidenced by his confession. His act of drilling holes in the floor above the bank vault was a direct, unequivocal step towards the commission of the intended crime that went beyond mere preparation. It was the beginning of the "breaking" element of burglary. The law does not require that the last proximate act be taken to constitute an attempt. Once an attempt is found based on the defendant's acts advancing far enough towards the crime, voluntary abandonment is not a defense. The purpose of the law is to protect society from those who intend to injure it. When that intent is clearly established and the defendant's acts cause harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial if he does not complete the intended crime for some reason. While there was no direct proof Staples was intercepted, it could reasonably be inferred he realized his landlord had discovered his equipment and contacted police, which was the equivalent of an interception.

People v. Staples

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