People v. Spencer
84 NY2d 749, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Forcibly stopping a moving vehicle to request information constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which is unreasonable unless the police have at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime.
Facts:
- A woman reported to police that her boyfriend had assaulted her with a gun a day earlier.
- While driving around with police to find the suspect, the woman saw the defendant, a friend of her boyfriend, in a double-parked car.
- The woman told police that the defendant might know where her boyfriend was located.
- As the woman was speaking, the defendant's vehicle began to move and drive away.
- Police officers followed the defendant's car and used their turret lights and car horn to pull him over.
- After the stop, officers shined their flashlights into the car and saw a clear plastic bag containing what appeared to be marihuana at a passenger's feet.
- After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle, an officer observed the butt of a revolver protruding from underneath the driver’s seat.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and marihuana.
- The defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in the trial court, arguing the seizure was unconstitutional.
- The suppression court denied the defendant's motion, finding the police stop was permissible to request information.
- The defendant appealed the trial court's decision to the Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court's ruling.
- The defendant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment permit police to stop a moving vehicle and detain its driver, who is not suspected of any criminal activity, solely to ask for information about the whereabouts of a criminal suspect?
Opinions:
Majority - Ciparick, J.
No. The police stop of the defendant's moving vehicle was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The stop of an automobile is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations and is far more intrusive than approaching a pedestrian. In New York, such stops are permissible only for non-pretextual traffic checks or when police have at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the vehicle's occupants. The common-law right to request information does not extend to forcibly stopping a moving vehicle. The court applied a balancing test, weighing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Here, the governmental interest in investigating a past crime was less compelling than preventing an ongoing one, and the stop of a potential witness is not afforded the same latitude as the stop of a suspect. Allowing such 'informational stops' based on an officer's discretion would open a 'pandora's box' of pretextual seizures.
Dissenting - Levine, J.
Yes. The police stop of the defendant's car was a reasonable seizure that should be upheld. The majority misapplies the balancing test by undervaluing the substantial governmental interest in apprehending a violent, armed felon and preventing further harm. The police were not acting on a whim but on specific, objective information from the victim that the defendant would likely know the suspect's immediate whereabouts. The intrusion on the defendant was minimal and justified by the urgency of gathering fresh information. The stop was not arbitrary because it was based on objective facts, and there were no less intrusive alternatives available in a dynamic street situation. The majority's holding creates a rigid rule that improperly restricts reasonable and responsible police conduct.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high constitutional threshold required for police to stop a moving vehicle, drawing a sharp distinction between approaching a parked car and seizing a moving one. It clarifies that the general police power to request information does not, by itself, justify the forcible stop of a motorist who is not suspected of a crime. By prioritizing the driver's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure over the government's interest in investigating past crimes via potential witnesses, the case significantly limits the police's ability to use 'informational stops' as an investigative tool, thereby preventing a potential erosion of privacy rights through discretionary, pretextual traffic stops.
