People v. Sojka
2011 D.A.R. 8727, 196 Cal. App. 4th 733, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 400 (2011)
Rule of Law:
A trial court must instruct the jury on the defense of reasonable and good faith mistaken belief in consent (the Mayberry defense) when there is substantial evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct, even if the victim and defendant provide conflicting accounts of the events.
Facts:
- Sojka met the victim at a bar where they drank and socialized until midnight, exhibiting friendly and 'mildly amorous' behavior.
- Sojka drove the victim home, and he testified that they kissed and caressed in the car for 15 minutes, though the victim only recalled being affectionate.
- Upon arriving at the victim's apartment, the victim used the bathroom; her account states that when she exited, Sojka was naked and forced himself on her despite her objections.
- Sojka testified that they mutually undressed, engaged in consensual foreplay on the floor, and that the victim seemed to enjoy the contact and did not resist.
- Sojka climbed on top of the victim to attempt sexual intercourse.
- The victim pushed Sojka and yelled at him to stop.
- Sojka immediately ceased his advances, dressed, and left the apartment.
- The victim called 911 several hours later, and medical evidence showed injuries consistent with her account but also potentially consistent with consensual sex.
Procedural Posture:
- The state charged Sojka with attempted rape by force and several other sexual offenses.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial where Sojka requested a jury instruction on the defense of reasonable belief in consent.
- The trial court denied the requested instruction.
- The jury convicted Sojka of attempted rape by force, acquitted him of attempted sexual penetration, and deadlocked on the remaining charges.
- Sojka appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of reasonable but mistaken belief in consent when the defendant testifies to consensual foreplay but the victim testifies to forcible conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Siggins, J.
Yes, the refusal to instruct on mistaken belief in consent was error because the defendant's testimony constituted substantial evidence of equivocal conduct. The court reasoned that under People v. Mayberry, a defendant who holds a reasonable, good-faith belief that the victim consented lacks the specific intent required for rape. The Attorney General argued that because the stories were diametrically opposed (force vs. consent), there was no evidence of 'equivocal conduct.' The court rejected this, holding that the jury should not be forced to entirely disregard the defendant's testimony regarding the events leading up to the attempted intercourse. Sojka's testimony that the victim enjoyed the foreplay created a factual basis for a mistaken belief in consent to intercourse. The error was prejudicial because the prosecutor argued that Sojka's subjective thoughts were irrelevant, which misled the jury regarding the specific intent element of attempted rape.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the subjective component of specific intent crimes in the context of sexual assault. It clarifies that a 'he-said, she-said' scenario—where the accuser alleges force and the accused alleges consent—does not automatically preclude a 'mistake of fact' instruction. If the defendant offers substantial evidence (such as testimony of mutual foreplay) that could lead a reasonable person to misinterpret the victim's willingness, the jury must be equipped to evaluate whether the defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent. It prevents the trial court from usurping the jury's role in weighing the credibility of the defendant's version of events.
