People v. Smith
97 Daily Journal DAR 12263, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1470, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 604 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Assault with a deadly weapon requires the specific intent to commit a battery, meaning an unlawful attempt to apply physical force upon another, and cannot be satisfied by a showing of mere criminal negligence or that physical force was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's intentional act.
Facts:
- On New Year's Eve, police officers formed a "V" barricade across Highway 50 and Stateline Boulevard to control pedestrian and vehicular traffic following celebrations.
- Reginald Smith and his companion, Christina Jensen, drove Smith's Porsche down Stateline toward the police barricade.
- An officer stopped Smith's car and told him he would have to turn around; Smith told the officer someone was shouting at him and asked to be allowed to go through the police lines.
- Officer Brown told Smith to wait while he spoke with other officers, then walked to the rear of Smith's car.
- Jensen told Smith that officers were signaling them to go forward, and Smith testified he saw two officers motioning him to proceed through the lines.
- Smith then drove his car forward, revving the engine, and his car struck Officer Becker.
- Officer Becker landed on top of the Porsche, his right arm went through the open sunroof, and he grabbed Smith by the face to get him to stop.
- Smith continued driving for approximately 100 feet until a police car pulled in front of his Porsche, blocking his path and forcing him to stop.
Procedural Posture:
- Reginald Calvin Smith was charged with the offense of assault with a deadly weapon (ADW) upon a peace officer (Penal Code § 245, subd. (c)).
- He was convicted after a jury trial in the superior court (trial court).
- Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation on condition he serve five months in the county jail.
- Smith, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, arguing the trial court prejudicially misinstructed the jury on the mental state required for the offense.
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Issue:
Does the offense of assault with a deadly weapon (ADW) require proof that the defendant intended to commit a battery, or is it sufficient to prove only that the defendant intended to commit an act, the natural and probable consequence of which would be the application of physical force upon another?
Opinions:
Majority - Blease, Acting P. J.
No, negligence does not satisfy the mental state required for conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. The court reversed Smith's conviction, holding that the trial court's abbreviated jury instruction, which stated that general criminal intent was satisfied by an "intent to commit an act, the natural and probable consequence of which if successfully completed would be the application of physical force upon the person of another," erroneously applied a negligence standard. The court reasoned that "natural and probable consequences" is an objective test, legally equivalent to reasonably foreseeable consequences, which is the hallmark of negligence or recklessness, but not the specific intent required for assault. Penal Code section 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." The term "attempt" inherently connotes the intent to accomplish its object, thus requiring an "intent to commit a battery" (citing People v. Wolcott and People v. Rocha). The court clarified that while People v. Rocha included the "natural and probable consequences" language, it did so in the context of defining a deadly weapon (means "likely to produce" great bodily injury) and the foreseeability of great bodily injury as a consequence of the assault, not as a substitute for the intent to commit a battery (the "least touching") as the mental state for the assault itself. The court explicitly rejected the application of a negligence or recklessness standard for assault, distinguishing it from the "substantially certain to result" standard which denotes an oblique intention—a form of intent—as discussed in People v. Colantuono and legal treatises. The instruction given eliminated the requirement of intent to commit a battery and allowed the jury to convict based on Smith's intent to move his car forward in circumstances where injury was merely foreseeable, thereby precluding proper consideration of his defense theory and constituting prejudicial error.
Analysis:
This case critically clarifies the mens rea (mental state) for assault and, by extension, assault with a deadly weapon (ADW) in California. It firmly establishes that assault requires an intent to commit a battery—a purposeful, unlawful application of force, however slight—and cannot be satisfied by mere negligence, even if an injury is a foreseeable "natural and probable consequence" of an intentional act. This ruling is significant for future jury instructions, ensuring that defendants' intent is properly considered and preventing convictions based on a lower standard of culpability than the law requires for assault. It reinforces the fundamental distinction between criminal negligence and true criminal intent, particularly in "attempt" crimes like assault.
