People v. Serravo
823 P.2d 128 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' in the statutory test for legal insanity refers to a cognitive incapacity to distinguish right from wrong as measured by existing societal standards of morality, not by a purely legal standard or a defendant's personal subjective moral code.
Facts:
- Robert Serravo was a union employee visiting striking colleagues on the night of May 9, 1987.
- Upon returning home around 12:30 a.m. on May 10, Serravo read the Bible, then went upstairs and stabbed his sleeping wife, Joyce Serravo, in the back.
- When his wife awoke, Serravo told her that an intruder had stabbed her and that he would go call for help, a story he initially repeated to the police.
- Several weeks later, Serravo's wife discovered letters he had written in which he admitted to the stabbing, stating their marriage was 'severed' and that he had gone 'to be with Jehovah in heaven'.
- When confronted about the letters, Serravo told his wife that God had told him to stab her in order to sever their marriage bond.
- Psychiatric experts testified that Serravo suffered from a delusional disorder or paranoid schizophrenia, causing him to believe he had a special relationship with God and was on a divine mission.
- The experts testified Serravo believed his act was morally justified because God had ordained it, even though he was likely aware that the act of stabbing was contrary to law.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Serravo was charged with attempted first-degree murder and other crimes in a Colorado trial court.
- Serravo entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
- At a separate trial on the issue of sanity, the trial court instructed the jury that 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' includes a person who believes his criminal conduct is morally right because of a mental disease.
- The prosecution objected to the jury instruction, arguing it was based on a subjective moral standard.
- The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
- The prosecution, as appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling on the jury instruction as a question of law to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, as the intermediate appellate court, approved the trial court's ruling.
- The Colorado Supreme Court, as the state's highest court, granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' in Colorado's statutory definition of legal insanity refer to a defendant's cognitive inability to distinguish legal right from legal wrong, or does it refer to an inability to distinguish right from wrong based on societal standards of morality?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Quinn
No, the phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' refers to an inability to distinguish right from wrong based on societal standards of morality, not merely legal wrong. Construing 'wrong' as moral wrong, measured by societal standards, prevents the formalistic legalism of holding a psychotically deluded person responsible simply because they knew an act was illegal. Relying on the reasoning in People v. Schmidt, the court found that the M'Naghten rule, upon which Colorado's statute is based, intended 'wrong' to be conceived as moral wrong. The statute's own distinction between insanity and 'moral obliquity' confirms that the legislature intended a moral, not legal, standard. However, this moral standard must be societal and objective, not personal and subjective, to prevent defendants from using their own idiosyncratic moral codes as a defense. A 'deific-decree' delusion, where a defendant believes God commanded the act, is not an exception to this test but an integral factor in assessing whether the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong was destroyed.
Dissenting - Justice Vollack
Yes, the phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' should refer to a defendant's inability to distinguish legal right from legal wrong. The statute codifies the original, rigid M'Naghten test, which focuses exclusively on the cognitive capacity to know that an act is 'contrary to the law of the land.' By not adopting the broader 'wrongfulness' language of the Model Penal Code, the Colorado legislature showed its intent to maintain this restrictive legal standard. A moral standard is an unreliable and unworkable test for insanity. Furthermore, the majority's treatment of the 'deific decree' delusion improperly incorporates a subjective standard into a test that the legislature intended to be purely cognitive and objective.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the insanity defense in Colorado by defining 'wrong' in the M'Naghten test as moral wrong according to societal standards, rather than legal wrong. This aligns Colorado with a modern trend in interpreting the M'Naghten rule and prevents the conviction of defendants who, due to severe mental illness, lack a moral comprehension of their actions despite a sterile awareness of illegality. By establishing an objective societal standard, the court prevents the defense from becoming a subjective free-for-all based on personal moral beliefs. The integration of the 'deific-decree' delusion into the cognitive analysis, rather than as a separate exception, provides a more coherent framework for juries to evaluate such cases without adding a volitional component to the test.
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