People v. Serrano
850 N.E.2d 1151, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court has the discretion under CPL § 270.15(1)(a) to call more than twelve prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning, and this procedure will not be deemed an abuse of discretion unless the defendant can demonstrate actual prejudice.
Facts:
- In June 2001, Defendant was arrested during a buy-and-bust operation for selling heroin.
- At the start of his trial's jury selection, the court called a panel of 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous questioning.
- Twelve of the prospective jurors were seated in the jury box.
- The remaining 32 prospective jurors were seated in the first four rows of the courtroom's public seating area.
- Defendant's attorney objected, stating that since many of the prospective jurors were seated behind him, it would be difficult to conduct an effective voir dire.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in a New York trial court.
- At trial, the defense's objection to the court's procedure of questioning 44 prospective jurors simultaneously was overruled.
- Defendant (as appellant) appealed his conviction to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Defendant (as appellant) then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion under New York CPL § 270.15(1)(a) by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire, some of whom are seated outside the jury box and behind defense counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Memorandum
No. A trial court does not abuse its discretion under CPL § 270.15(1)(a) by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning. The governing statute requires that "not less than twelve" prospective jurors be called, but intentionally sets no upper limit to allow for judicial efficiency. The legislative history confirms that the statute was amended to permit the simultaneous examination of as many jurors as possible. For a court's procedure to be considered an abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice, such as an inability to observe, hear, or assess the prospective jurors. In this case, the defendant failed to make such a showing, and the record contains no evidence of prejudice.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the broad discretion granted to trial judges in managing courtroom procedures, particularly jury selection. It establishes that a challenge to a large-panel voir dire method will fail unless the defendant can prove concrete prejudice, rather than just procedural inconvenience. By prioritizing judicial efficiency and placing a high burden on the defendant to show harm, this ruling makes it more difficult to appeal convictions based on the mechanics of voir dire alone, solidifying the trend towards more efficient, if less individualized, jury selection processes.
