In re The People of Colorado v. Segovia
196 P.3d 1126 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
An act of shoplifting is probative of a witness's character for truthfulness and may be inquired into on cross-examination under CRE 608(b); a trial court's erroneous exclusion of such questioning and subsequent declaration of a mistrial does not constitute a manifest necessity, thus barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Facts:
- Jose Palma Segovia (Palma) was charged with sexual assault on a child, T.L.
- Palma's defense theory was that T.L. had fabricated the allegations against him.
- During the trial, Palma's defense counsel cross-examined T.L., the prosecution's chief witness.
- Defense counsel asked T.L. if, on a specific date, she and another person had stolen $100 from her mother's store.
- T.L. denied that she had stolen the money.
Procedural Posture:
- Jose Palma Segovia (Palma) was brought to trial in a state trial court on a charge of sexual assault on a child.
- During the cross-examination of the complaining witness, the prosecutor objected to a question from defense counsel regarding the witness's alleged prior act of shoplifting.
- The trial court sustained the objection, ruling the question was improper.
- The trial court then, on its own initiative (sua sponte), declared a mistrial, concluding the error could not be corrected.
- Palma filed a motion to dismiss the charge on double jeopardy grounds.
- The trial court denied Palma's motion and scheduled a new trial.
- Palma sought review of the trial court's denial of his motion by initiating an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of Colorado.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibit the retrial of a defendant when the trial court declares a mistrial based on its erroneous evidentiary ruling that a defense question about a witness's prior act of shoplifting was improper?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rice
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial because the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was not justified by manifest necessity. The court's reasoning was that the evidentiary ruling that prompted the mistrial was an error of law. The defense counsel's question about the witness's prior act of shoplifting was proper for impeachment under Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 608(b), not an issue of prior bad acts under CRE 404(b). The court adopted the 'middle view,' holding that acts of theft like shoplifting are probative of a witness's character for truthfulness. Because the question was posed on cross-examination, it was intrinsic evidence and the correct method of inquiry under the rule. Since the question was proper, there was no error in the proceedings, and therefore no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Even if the question had been improper, a curative instruction to the jury would have been a sufficient and less drastic alternative.
Dissenting - Justice Eid
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause should not prohibit retrial because the trial court acted within its discretion. The majority's holding ignores the plain language of CRE 608(b), which gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow such questioning even if the conduct is probative of truthfulness. The trial judge reasonably exercised this discretion due to concerns about the question's prejudicial impact, the defense counsel's failure to provide notice in violation of a pretrial order, and whether the incident even constituted theft. Furthermore, a trial court's finding of manifest necessity is entitled to great deference, especially when it involves assessing the prejudicial impact of statements on a jury. The majority improperly substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial judge, who was in the best position to determine that a curative instruction would be insufficient.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies Colorado evidence law by establishing that acts of theft, like shoplifting, are considered probative of truthfulness for impeachment purposes under CRE 608(b). By adopting the 'middle view,' the court broadens the scope of permissible cross-examination beyond acts involving explicit deceit to include conduct reflecting a general disregard for the rights of others. The ruling also reinforces the high constitutional standard for 'manifest necessity,' limiting a trial court's ability to declare a mistrial over evidentiary disputes and thereby protecting a defendant's right to avoid double jeopardy. Future cases will now operate under the clear precedent that shoplifting is a valid subject for witness impeachment in Colorado.
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