People v. Scott
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9229, 927 p.2d 288, 14 Cal. 4th 544 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of transferred intent permits a defendant's intent to kill an intended victim to be transferred to an unintended victim to establish malice for a murder charge, even when the defendant is also prosecuted for the attempted murder of the intended victim.
Facts:
- After a romantic relationship between Calvin Hughes and Elaine Scott soured, Hughes and Scott had a physical altercation.
- Scott's adult sons, Damien Scott and Derrick Brown, intervened and forced Hughes out of Scott's apartment.
- A few days later, Hughes returned to the apartment to retrieve his belongings, and Scott threatened to page her sons.
- Later, while Hughes was at Jesse Owens Park, Scott and Brown arrived in a car and fired multiple shots from an automatic weapon into the park, targeting Hughes.
- Hughes took cover and was not seriously harmed, though a bullet struck his shoe.
- The gunfire struck and killed a bystander, Jack Gibson, and wounded another man, Gary Tripp.
Procedural Posture:
- Damien Scott and Derrick Brown were charged in a California trial court with, among other things, the murder of Jack Gibson and the attempted murder of Calvin Hughes and Gary Tripp.
- The first trial resulted in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury.
- At a second trial, the court instructed the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent regarding the murder charge.
- The jury convicted Scott and Brown of second degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, and other related charges.
- The defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeal, arguing the transferred intent instruction was improper because they were also charged with attempted murder of the intended victim.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments of conviction.
- The Supreme Court of California granted defendant Scott's petition for review.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of transferred intent apply to a murder charge for an unintended victim when the defendant is also charged with the attempted murder of the intended victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown, J.
Yes. The doctrine of transferred intent may be used to assign criminal liability to a defendant who kills an unintended victim even when the defendant is also prosecuted for the attempted murder of an intended victim. The court reasoned that the doctrine is not a literal transfer of intent that is "used up" on the attempted murder charge, but rather a legal policy ensuring that a defendant who intends to kill one person but kills another is punished for a crime of the same seriousness. In this situation, the defendants committed crimes against two separate individuals: the attempted murder of Calvin Hughes and the murder of Jack Gibson. Liability for the former is determined by the attempted murder statute, while liability for the latter can be properly established through the classic application of transferred intent.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
While concurring in the judgment, this opinion argues for abrogating the doctrine of transferred intent as a "peculiarly mischievous" and "unnecessary legal fiction." The doctrine is unnecessary because malice aforethought does not need to be directed at a specific victim. The law requires an unlawful intent to kill a human being, not the intended human being. Therefore, a defendant who intends to kill Person A but kills Person B still possesses the requisite mens rea for murder without needing to resort to the fiction of "transferring" intent. The same just result can be reached through a more direct legal analysis.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the application of the transferred intent doctrine in California for the classic "bad aim" scenario where the intended victim survives and a bystander is killed. It clarifies that a prosecutor can simultaneously charge a defendant with attempted murder of the intended victim and use transferred intent to secure a murder conviction for the unintended victim, refuting the argument that intent is "used up." By defining the doctrine as a policy rather than a literal transfer, the court provides a strong rationale for its use in cases involving multiple victims, though it explicitly leaves open the question of how the doctrine applies when both the intended and unintended victims are killed.
