People v. Schafer
946 P.2d 938, 1997 Colo. LEXIS 824, 1997 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1914 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A person camping in a tent on unimproved, publicly accessible land that is not fenced or posted against trespassing, and in the absence of personal notice against trespass, has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in that tent and their personal effects, requiring a warrant for search.
Facts:
- On the morning of October 19, 1996, around 10:00 a.m., an armed robbery occurred at the Chief One Stop convenience store in Cortez, Colorado, and the clerk reported the robber fled east on foot.
- A friend of the clerk informed police that a “transient” was camping in a tent behind Stromstead’s Restaurant, about a half mile east of the Chief One Stop.
- Scott E. Schafer owned a two-person tent and personal items, including a backpack, which he had set up the night of October 18, 1996, on vacant, privately owned, but publicly accessible and unused land that was neither fenced nor posted against trespass.
- On the morning of October 19, 1996, Schafer left his tent, with flaps closed and zipper shut, to have breakfast and conduct errands in town.
- Four police officers proceeded to the location of the tent, and without a search warrant, opened the closed and zippered tent, then opened Schafer's backpack, removed an address book, and copied the name “Scott Robert Schafer” from an envelope therein.
- The officers then left the scene without removing any object from the tent.
- Schafer returned to his tent around noon on October 19, 1996, and discovered his belongings had been disturbed or “ransacked.”
- Several months later, following a domestic violence complaint, Schafer was arrested in Montrose, Colorado, for possession of a stolen weapon, and the Chief One Stop clerk later identified Schafer from a photo lineup as the robber.
Procedural Posture:
- Scott E. Schafer was charged with aggravated robbery and carrying a concealed weapon in Montezuma County District Court.
- Prior to trial, Schafer filed a motion to suppress testimony and other evidence based on the warrantless search of his tent and backpack.
- The Montezuma County District Court granted Schafer's motion to suppress, finding he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that no exigent circumstances existed.
- The District Attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial District then brought an interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, challenging the suppression order.
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Issue:
Does a person camping in a tent on unimproved, publicly accessible land that is not fenced or posted against trespass have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring a warrant for search, and were exigent circumstances present to justify a warrantless search in this case?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hobbs
No, a person camping in a tent on unimproved, publicly accessible land does have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search in this case. The court first addressed Schafer's standing, finding he had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he owned the tent and was using it for habitation. Under Colorado law (§ 18-4-201(3)), one has a license and privilege to enter unimproved, unfenced, unposted land without personal notice of trespass, meaning Schafer was in lawful possession. The court recognized that tents have a long history as habitation in Colorado and the West, serving as shelter and providing privacy. Whether temporary or longer-term, a tent screens its inhabitant from public view and signals a claim to privacy, entitling its occupation to equivalent protection from unreasonable governmental intrusion as homes or hotel rooms (citing United States v. Gooch). The court further found that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search. The threat of evidence destruction was not real and immediate, as the tent and its contents would have remained had surveillance been maintained (citing United States v. Chadwick that mobility of luggage doesn't justify dispensing with the Warrant Clause). Moreover, the police lacked probable cause to link the tent's occupant to the robbery; the only information was that a “transient” was camping east of the store, which was insufficient to believe the tent contained the suspect or evidence. The district court's findings that probable cause and exigent circumstances did not exist, and that Schafer had a reasonable expectation of privacy, were supported by the record and upheld. Therefore, the evidence discovered during the warrantless search must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant precedent for Fourth Amendment protection of temporary dwellings, affirming that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent used for habitation, even on unimproved, publicly accessible land. It clarifies that such privacy is personal, not location-dependent, and that 'transient' status does not negate these rights. The ruling reinforces the high bar for exigent circumstances and probable cause, emphasizing that generalized suspicion or the inherent mobility of an object is insufficient to bypass warrant requirements. This decision has a substantial impact on law enforcement procedures, particularly in areas with extensive outdoor and camping activities, necessitating careful adherence to constitutional protections for all forms of habitation.
