People v. Satchell
489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 6 Cal. 3d 28 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
For a felony to support a second-degree felony-murder instruction, it must be inherently dangerous to human life when viewed in the abstract, meaning the offense itself, and not merely the circumstances of its commission, creates a high probability of death or serious injury. Mere passive possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (Pen. Code § 12021) or possession of a sawed-off shotgun (Pen. Code § 12020) are not considered inherently dangerous felonies when viewed in the abstract.
Facts:
- On July 2, 1969, John M. Satchell and the victim, Jordan, became involved in a heated argument on a public street in San Francisco.
- Satchell shoved Jordan, who then withdrew some distance down the street.
- Satchell went to his nearby parked automobile and got in.
- Jordan returned a few minutes later and walked over to Satchell's car, resuming the argument.
- Satchell emerged from his car holding a sawed-off shotgun.
- Satchell shot Jordan once in the chest, killing him, and then drove off.
- Satchell testified he shot Jordan in self-defense, believing Jordan was threatening him and attempting to draw a weapon.
- A defense witness testified Jordan had a gun in his hand at the time of the shooting, which was taken from him after Satchell departed.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant John M. Satchell was charged in a two-count indictment with murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), with four prior felony convictions alleged.
- Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to the two substantive counts and admitted the four prior convictions.
- The jury acquitted Satchell of the aggravated assault charge but found him guilty of murder of the second degree.
- Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the second-degree felony-murder instruction should not have been given, but the motion was denied.
- Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does the offense of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (Pen. Code § 12021) or possession of a sawed-off shotgun (Pen. Code § 12020), when viewed in the abstract, constitute a felony inherently dangerous to human life sufficient to support a second-degree felony-murder instruction?
Opinions:
Majority - Sullivan, J.
No, the offenses of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (Pen. Code § 12021) and possession of a sawed-off shotgun (Pen. Code § 12020), when viewed in the abstract, are not inherently dangerous to human life and therefore cannot support a second-degree felony-murder instruction. The court reaffirmed that the felony-murder doctrine, which imputes malice for killings occurring during certain felonies, should be narrowly applied and not extended beyond its rational function, as it "erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability." To determine if a felony is inherently dangerous, courts must look to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the specific facts of how the crime was committed in the particular case. The court rejected previous rulings that had allowed Penal Code § 12021 to support felony murder because those decisions did not properly apply the abstract test. It reasoned that the broad range of felonies means that a person with a prior felony conviction does not necessarily demonstrate a propensity for acts dangerous to human life simply by possessing a concealable weapon. Similarly, mere passive possession of a sawed-off shotgun (Pen. Code § 12020) is not inherently dangerous in the abstract, as the statute makes no distinction between an innocent collector and a hardened criminal. To impute malice in such cases would extend the doctrine beyond its rational purpose. The erroneous instruction was prejudicial because it relieved the jury of finding actual malice aforethought, thus requiring reversal.
Dissenting - McComb, J.
No, the judgment should not be reversed, because the error in instruction, if any, did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The dissenting justice argued that under Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, a judgment should only be set aside if the error complained of has resulted in a "miscarriage of justice," implying that the instructional error in this case did not meet that high standard.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrowed the application of the second-degree felony-murder rule in California, solidifying the 'abstract test' for determining whether an underlying felony is 'inherently dangerous.' By refusing to allow regulatory offenses of mere passive possession (like ex-felon in possession of a firearm or possession of a sawed-off shotgun) to serve as predicate felonies, the court reinforced the principle that the felony-murder rule's imputation of malice must be logically tied to the inherent nature of the felony itself, not the specific dangerous conduct of the defendant. This decision curtails the expansion of strict liability murder, compelling prosecutors to prove actual malice when the underlying felony is not, by its very nature, a crime that consistently creates a high risk of death, thereby ensuring a closer link between criminal liability and moral culpability.
