People v. Saille
54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under California law, as amended in 1981, the defense of diminished capacity is abolished, and therefore evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental disorder cannot negate malice aforethought to reduce a murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter. Express malice is established by the intent to unlawfully kill, and evidence of intoxication is only admissible on the question of whether the defendant actually formed that intent.
Facts:
- On November 30, 1985, Daniel Saille began drinking heavily before noon, consuming 15-18 beers by evening and several more at a bar.
- A security guard, David Ballagh, ejected the visibly intoxicated Saille from Eva's Cafe around 9 p.m.
- Saille returned to the cafe twice more over the next two hours and was refused entry by Ballagh on both occasions.
- After being turned away the third time, Saille told Ballagh, 'I’m going to get a gun and kill you.'
- Around 1 a.m., Saille went home, retrieved a semiautomatic assault rifle, and returned to the bar.
- Upon entering, Saille told Ballagh, 'I told you I would be back.'
- During a struggle over the rifle between Saille and Ballagh, the weapon discharged, killing a patron, Guadalupe Borba.
- A blood sample taken from Saille two hours after the shooting showed a blood-alcohol level of .14 percent, estimated to have been .19 percent at the time of the killing.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Saille was initially convicted in a trial court of first degree murder and attempted murder.
- This first conviction was reversed by an appellate court due to Wheeler error.
- Upon retrial in the trial court, Saille was again convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder.
- Saille, as appellant, appealed the second conviction to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal on this issue.
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Issue:
Does California law, following the legislative abolition of the diminished capacity defense and the redefinition of malice aforethought in Penal Code § 188, still permit a reduction of murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter based on evidence that voluntary intoxication or mental disorder negated malice?
Opinions:
Majority - Panelli, J.
No, California law no longer permits a reduction of murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter based on a theory that voluntary intoxication or mental disorder negated malice. The Legislature's 1981 amendments to the Penal Code, particularly the revision of section 188, effectively abolished the defense of 'diminished capacity voluntary manslaughter.' The court reasoned that prior judicial decisions, such as People v. Conley, had expanded the definition of malice to include an 'awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws.' The Legislature directly repudiated this expansion by amending section 188 to state that malice is simply the 'deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature,' and that no other mental state is required. Consequently, express malice and the intent to unlawfully kill are now one and the same. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is therefore no longer relevant to negating this simplified definition of malice, but remains admissible under section 22 solely on the issue of whether the defendant actually formed the specific intent to kill. If such evidence raises a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill, the resulting crime would be involuntary manslaughter, not voluntary manslaughter.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legislative abolition of the court-created doctrine of diminished capacity in California homicide law. By holding that the amended Penal Code § 188 equates express malice with the intent to kill, the court eliminated the legal pathway for defendants to argue for 'nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter' based on intoxication or mental illness. The ruling clarifies that such evidence does not provide a partial excuse to mitigate murder, but rather goes directly to whether the prosecution can prove the basic element of intent to kill. This significantly narrows the application of intoxication evidence and places a higher burden on defendants seeking to use it, as they must now argue they lacked any homicidal intent, rather than a more nuanced form of malice.
