People v. Russell
187 Cal. App. 4th 981, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1465 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under the felony-murder escape rule, a killing committed during a perpetrator's flight from a burglary is considered first-degree murder because the crime is not complete until the felon has reached a place of temporary safety. This rule applies even if there is no immediate pursuit from the crime scene.
Facts:
- Around 4:30 a.m., Karl Joseph Russell, Jr. was seen by a neighbor, Ryan Creighton, on the porch of the Meurs' residence while the Meurs family was away.
- After being startled by a loud noise from Creighton, Russell went back inside the Meurs' home.
- Russell burglarized the home and stole the Meurs' white Oldsmobile from their garage.
- At approximately 4:52 a.m., about four miles from the burglarized home, Police Sergeant Mickey Williams observed Russell driving the stolen Oldsmobile.
- Upon noticing the marked patrol car, Russell sped through a red light, initiating a high-speed police chase.
- The chase ended when Russell crashed the stolen car into a pickup truck, killing its driver, Rodrigo Vega.
- Russell then fled the crash scene on foot but was quickly apprehended by police.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Karl Joseph Russell, Jr., with first degree murder, evading an officer, residential burglary, and vehicle theft in a California superior court (trial court).
- Following a court trial (a trial by judge, without a jury), the trial court found Russell guilty on all counts.
- The trial court sentenced Russell to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life.
- Russell appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the California Court of Appeal, arguing the evidence was insufficient and the sentence was cruel and unusual.
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Issue:
Does the felony-murder escape rule apply to a killing that occurs during a high-speed police chase that begins approximately 15 minutes after and four miles away from the initial burglary, when the perpetrator has not yet reached a place of temporary safety?
Opinions:
Majority - Huffman, Acting P. J.
Yes, the felony-murder escape rule applies because the killing and the burglary were part of one continuous transaction. The court reasoned that a felony is not legally complete until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety. Whether a defendant has reached such a place is an objective question of fact for the trial court. The court found substantial evidence that Russell was still in flight from the burglary when the fatal crash occurred, pointing to the short time frame (12-15 minutes), the relatively short distance (4 miles), the fact that Russell left belongings at the scene in a hasty retreat, and his immediate and reckless flight upon seeing a police officer. Citing People v. Johnson, the court rejected the argument that immediate pursuit from the crime scene is required, holding that the key inquiry is whether the felon has reached a place of temporary safety.
Dissenting - McIntyre, J.
No, the felony-murder escape rule should not apply because the burglary and the homicide were not part of one continuous transaction. The dissent argued that Russell had actually reached a place of temporary safety as a matter of law. This conclusion was based on the significant lapse of time (about 15 minutes), the distance from the scene (nearly five miles), the lack of any immediate pursuit from the burglary, and the fact that police were not aware a burglary had occurred when they initiated the stop. Therefore, the connection between the initial crime and the killing was too tenuous to support a first-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule.
Analysis:
This case affirms and arguably expands the application of the felony-murder escape rule to burglaries in California. The decision clarifies that the 'continuous transaction' doctrine does not require an immediate 'hot pursuit' from the crime scene itself. Instead, it solidifies an objective, fact-based inquiry into whether the perpetrator had reached a 'place of temporary safety,' giving trial courts significant leeway to find a killing is connected to the underlying felony based on circumstantial evidence like a suspect's flight from police miles away and minutes later. This precedent makes it easier for prosecutors to secure first-degree murder convictions for deaths that occur during an escape, even when the escape is temporarily interrupted or the police pursuit begins for unrelated reasons.
