People v. Roe
542 N.E.2d 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's conduct may evince a depraved indifference to human life, elevating a reckless homicide to murder, when the defendant engages in an act that creates a grave and wanton risk of death, such as playing "Polish roulette" with a shotgun. The determination of depraved indifference is an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct, not an inquiry into the defendant's subjective state of mind.
Facts:
- The defendant, Steven Roe, a 15-and-a-half-year-old, had a detailed knowledge of firearms, including his father's 12-gauge shotgun.
- On August 14, 1984, 13-year-old Darrin Seifert and another friend, Dennis Bleakley, were at Roe's home.
- Roe retrieved his father's shotgun and a set of five shells, knowing that three were live and two were "dummies."
- Roe randomly loaded four of the five shells into the shotgun's magazine.
- He then pumped a shell into the firing chamber, not knowing whether it was a live or dummy round.
- Roe raised the shotgun, pointed it directly at Seifert who was standing 10 feet away, and said, "Let’s play Polish roulette. Who is first?"
- Roe pulled the trigger, discharging a live round that struck Seifert in the chest and killed him.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Steven Roe, was charged with crimes including murder in the second degree.
- Following a bench trial in the trial court, Roe was convicted of depraved indifference murder.
- Roe, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- A Judge of the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) granted the defendant permission to appeal the Appellate Division's decision.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's conduct of knowingly loading a shotgun with a random mix of live and dummy shells, pointing it directly at another person from close range, and pulling the trigger constitute legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2)?
Opinions:
Majority - Hancock, Jr., J.
Yes. The defendant's conduct of creating a macabre game of chance provides a legally sufficient basis for a trier of fact to find the "depraved indifference to human life" necessary to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder. The culpable mental state for this crime is recklessness, which was undisputedly present. The escalating element of depraved indifference is not a mens rea inquiry but an objective assessment of the degree of risk created by the defendant's conduct. Here, the defendant's actions—knowingly mixing live and dummy rounds, chambering a shell without knowing which it was, aiming at the victim, and pulling the trigger—created a grave, wanton, and imminent risk of death. This conduct is analogous to playing Russian roulette or firing into a crowd, which are classic examples of depraved indifference murder. The defendant's age or emotional state after the shooting are not relevant to the objective assessment of the risk his conduct created.
Dissenting - Bellacosa, J.
No. The evidence is legally insufficient to elevate the defendant's reckless conduct to the level of depraved indifference murder; it establishes only reckless manslaughter. Depraved indifference murder requires a level of callousness and extreme cruelty equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder, which was not proven here. The defendant's immediate remorse, distress, and attempts to get help for the victim directly contradict the 'hardness of heart' or 'wicked disposition' that characterizes depravity. By upholding this conviction, the majority obliterates the critical legal distinction between murder and manslaughter, allowing prosecutors to overcharge reckless homicides based on actions that, while tragic, do not demonstrate the malignant state required for the higher offense. This defendant's actions, though criminally reckless, are not comparable to firing into a packed barroom or systematically beating a child.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that the "depraved indifference" element of second-degree murder under New York law is determined by an objective assessment of the defendant's actions, not their subjective feelings or intent. By affirming the conviction, the court solidified the precedent from People v. Register, making it clear that a defendant's post-act remorse is irrelevant to the objective gravity of the risk they created. The decision establishes that creating a game of chance with a human life, such as "Polish roulette," is legally sufficient to meet the high standard for depraved indifference, thereby expanding the applicability of this charge to scenarios involving extreme, one-on-one risk-taking.
