People v. Roche
98 N.Y.2d 70, 772 N.E.2d 1133, 745 N.Y.S.2d 775 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) unless there is sufficient evidence to establish both the subjective element (defendant acted under the influence of EED) and the objective element (a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance). Proof of brutal or violent acts alone, or a defendant's inconsistent statements and calculated post-homicide behavior, is insufficient to demonstrate EED.
Facts:
- In December 1991, Lillian Rivera was brutally stabbed 12 to 14 times in the face, back, and chest, found in the Manhattan apartment she shared with the defendant, with a trail of blood suggesting a violent struggle.
- Two weeks prior to the stabbing, defendant confided in his neighbor, Gilberto Franco, that Rivera was "crazy and hooked on drugs," and he was "tired and wanted to leave."
- On the day of the crime, Franco and Norma Ruiz, another tenant, saw defendant and Rivera arguing in the building lobby; later, Franco heard a loud argument and glass breaking from their apartment.
- Approximately 40-50 minutes after hearing the argument, defendant ran down the stairs yelling that Rivera had killed herself and that someone should call the police; he was seen carrying a small brown bag and later emerged with a duffle bag, stating he needed to remove items before the police checked.
- Defendant then arrived at an apartment in an adjacent building, removed sweaters he was wearing, ingested crack and heroin, and told Phillip Bell that "Mama" was dead and he had killed her, explaining she had been "going crazy" and "tearing up the place."
- Upon arriving at his sister's apartment, defendant changed his socks (which he then threw in the garbage) and privately told his sister that, in the course of an argument, he had hit his wife and believed she was dead.
- Defendant subsequently appeared at the police station, stating, "My wife killed herself. I want to find out who did this," and provided a written statement denying harming Rivera and claiming he found her body.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree for the December 1991 stabbing death of Lillian Rivera.
- Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree at his first trial.
- An intermediate appellate court (239 AD2d 270) reversed the conviction due to an improper Allen charge and remitted the case for retrial.
- At the second trial, the Supreme Court (trial court) again convicted defendant of murder in the second degree, and he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.
- The Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court) reversed the Supreme Court's conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
- One Justice at the Appellate Division dissented and granted the People leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance when the evidence presented, including the brutal nature of the crime and the defendant's actions and statements post-homicide, fails to establish that the defendant suffered from a mental infirmity or had a reasonable explanation for such a disturbance?
Opinions:
Majority - Graffeo, J.
No, a trial court does not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance when the evidence is insufficient to establish either element of the defense. The Court of Appeals held that the record was devoid of evidence that the defendant, Mr. Sanchez, actually suffered from a mental infirmity or loss of self-control at the time of the stabbing, which is the subjective element of the defense. Mr. Sanchez's statements to the police denying harming his wife, and his remarks to Bell and his sister, did not suggest a loss of self-control or mental disability. Furthermore, his behavior immediately after the killing, such as contriving a false explanation for the victim's wounds, purposefully removing items from the apartment to avoid police discovery, and attempting to evade detection by another guest, was inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. While the brutal nature of the wounds is relevant, the Court reiterated that a jury cannot infer the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance based solely on the crime's violence or brutality; such evidence must be linked to other compelling evidence of mental infirmity, which was absent here, unlike in People v. Moye where the defendant stated "something snapped." As for the objective element, the Court found that prior arguments and demands for errands, without more, did not constitute a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance, failing to rise to the level of an "understandable human response deserving of mercy" under the circumstances (citing People v. Casassa and People v. Harris). Therefore, the trial court properly denied the request for an extreme emotional disturbance charge.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high evidentiary bar for establishing the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, clarifying that neither the brutality of a crime nor a defendant's self-serving, inconsistent statements and calculated post-homicide conduct are sufficient, on their own, to warrant a jury instruction on the defense. It emphasizes that a defendant must present compelling evidence of actual loss of self-control due to a mental infirmity, and a reasonable explanation for such a disturbance, beyond mere anger or domestic disputes. This ruling limits the application of the EED defense, preventing it from becoming a catch-all for violent homicides and ensuring it is reserved for circumstances truly indicative of an understandable human response deserving of mercy.
