People v. Rizzo
61 NE 3d 92 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A legislative prohibition on court supervision as a sentencing option for a particular offense does not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, as such a prohibition is not a punishment so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community.
Facts:
- Vincent Rizzo drove his vehicle at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.
- His speed was 45 miles per hour in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit.
- The offense of aggravated speeding, as defined at the time, applied to speeds 40 miles per hour or more over the limit.
- Rizzo also allegedly changed lanes improperly by cutting between two semi-trucks at a high rate of speed.
Procedural Posture:
- Vincent Rizzo was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with aggravated speeding and improper lane usage.
- Rizzo filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated speeding charge, arguing that the statute precluding court supervision as a sentence was unconstitutional.
- The circuit court held a hearing on the motion.
- The circuit court granted Rizzo's motion, finding the statutory prohibition on supervision for aggravated speeding unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
- The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied.
- The State, as the appellant, filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois because the circuit court's order invalidated a state statute.
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Issue:
Does section 5-6-1(p) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which prohibits a disposition of court supervision for the offense of aggravated speeding, violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Karmeier
No, section 5-6-1(p) of the Unified Code of Corrections does not violate the proportionate penalties clause. A statutory prohibition on the dispositional option of supervision for aggravated speeding does not constitute a cruel and degrading punishment that shocks the moral sense of the community. The legislature has broad discretion to define crimes and fashion appropriate penalties, and courts will defer to this legislative judgment unless the penalty is clearly unconstitutional. The trial court erred by employing a cross-comparison analysis of different offenses, a method this court rejected in People v. Sharpe, and by improperly considering collateral consequences of a conviction, which are not direct governmental punishments.
Concurring - Justice Burke
No, the statute does not violate the proportionate penalties clause, but for different reasons. The absence of supervision as a dispositional option is not, itself, a 'penalty.' The actual penalty is the mandatory misdemeanor conviction, and making aggravated speeding a mandatory misdemeanor is not so cruel, degrading, or disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of the community. However, the circuit court's concern about the lack of judicial discretion to consider mitigating circumstances was valid, as demonstrated by the legislature's subsequent amendment of the statute to allow supervision for first offenders.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of cross-comparison analysis for proportionate penalties challenges, as established in People v. Sharpe. It reinforces the principle that courts must give significant deference to legislative determinations of criminal penalties, including those that limit judicial sentencing discretion. The decision also clarifies that collateral consequences of a conviction, such as impacts on employment or loans, are not considered part of the 'penalty' for constitutional analysis because they are not direct actions by the government to inflict punishment. This precedent makes it significantly harder to challenge a penalty's constitutionality based on its perceived severity relative to other, dissimilar offenses.
